The Crime of Conviction of John Choon Yoo: The Actual Criminality in the OLC During the Bush Administration by Lavitt, Joseph
Maine Law Review 
Volume 62 Number 1 Article 6 
January 2010 
The Crime of Conviction of John Choon Yoo: The Actual 
Criminality in the OLC During the Bush Administration 
Joseph Lavitt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agency Commons, and the President/Executive 
Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph Lavitt, The Crime of Conviction of John Choon Yoo: The Actual Criminality in the OLC During the 
Bush Administration, 62 Me. L. Rev. 155 (2010). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
156 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
THE CRIME OF CONVICTION OF JOHN CHOON 
YOO: THE ACTUAL CRIMINALITY IN THE OLC 
DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
Joseph Lavitt∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
At the outset of the administration of President Barack Obama, there is intense 
debate about whether to prosecute members of the former administration of 
President George W. Bush. This Article first considers whether officers who  
were in command and control of the Executive Branch of the government of the 
United States during the Bush administration can be excused from criminal 
responsibility on charges of illegal torture, based on their claim to have acted in 
good faith reliance upon the advice of attorneys employed by the Department of 
Justice.  
Focus then turns to the accountability, if any, of those attorneys in the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) who opined that so-called 
enhanced interrogation of persons in the custody of the United States was legally 
permissible.  The answer to this question turns not on the doctrine of command 
responsibility (as many have presupposed), but on its logical converse—whether 
subordinate members of an executive branch of government are responsible as 
principals for the conduct of superior officers who relied on their opinions. 
Finally, the doctrine of the unitary executive is examined through the prism of 
the conclusions about legal responsibility reached on the first two questions.  The 
projection of a “leadership principle” by John Choon Yoo and others into modern 
American scholarship and governance became the basis for putative criminality 
during the Bush administration.  That principle, as conceived by its proponents, is 
patently repugnant to American constitutional republicanism. Until a court imposes 
punishment for criminal wrongs over a defense based upon it, the exercise of 
presidential authority in times of crises in the United States will be likely to repeat 
the terrible mistakes of the all too recent past. 
II.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Following the devastating attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, 
President George W. Bush ordered various forms of retaliation against persons and 
countries believed to be harboring those responsible for the attack. President Bush 
first obtained a resolution by Congress that authorized the “use [of] all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons” connected to 
the September 11 attacks, “in order to prevent any future acts of international 
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terrorism against the United States.”1 
During the course of military and quasi-military operations following the 
September 11 attacks, numerous persons were captured and detained by agents of 
the United States.2  Those persons were found in plain clothes and apparently not 
fighting under the flag of any nation.3  The captured were deemed “enemy 
combatants” by the Bush administration.4  Many were subjected to intense 
questioning by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in an effort to gain 
information to prevent further attacks against the United States.  Among those 
persons held and questioned by the CIA was Abu Zubaydah, one of the alleged 
planners of the September 11 attacks.5  
The CIA came to believe by August 2002 that Zubaydah held information 
about planned, but not yet executed attacks on the United States by the members of 
an organization known as “Al Qaeda.”6  Absent coercion, they believed, Zubaydah, 
                                                                                                     
 1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 2. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).  In Gherebi, the court observed 
how quickly the Bush administration developed an understanding about the scope of its authority to 
detain persons perceived to be in conflict with the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001: 
The scope of the detention authority claimed by the President in the armed conflict 
authorized by the [Authorization for Use of Military Force] began to take shape within 
months of the passing of the joint resolution. On November 13, 2001, President Bush 
issued a Military Order entitled Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism. 
Id. at 43 (internal citations omitted). 
 3. During a news conference delivered on April 4, 2009, President Obama remarked that “[a]fter 
9/11, our allies declared the attacks on New York and Washington an attack on all. And together, we 
embarked on the first mission beyond Europe against an enemy that recognizes no borders or laws of 
war.”  President Barack Obama, News Conference at Palaiz de la Musique et Des Congres, Strasbourg, 
France (Apr. 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/News-Conference-By-
President-Obama-4-04-2009/.  
 4. Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to John Ashcroft, Attorney General 
(June 8, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memomilitarydetention06082002.pdf 
(advising that “the President [can] direct the capture of those in the service of an enemy whenever the 
United States [is] engaged in hostilities - even without a declaration of war”). See also Gherebi, 609 F. 
Supp. 2d, at 47 (“Individuals detained by President Bush’s Military Order were subsequently labeled 
‘enemy combatants’ by the Department of Defense, harkening back to a phrase used by the Supreme 
Court in a World War II-era case known as Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).”).  
 5. Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to John Rizzo, Acting General 
Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter “Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum”].  In the 
Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, the OLC affirmed information already acquired that suggested that:  
Zubaydah has been involved in every major terrorist operation carried out by Al Qaeda. 
He was a planner for the Millennium plot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets during the 
Millennium celebrations in Jordan. . . . He also served as a planner for the Paris 
Embassy plot in 2001. Moreover, he was one of the planners of the September 11 
attacks.  Prior to his capture, he was engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against 
U.S. interests.  
Id. at 7. 
 6. Id. In the Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, the OLC noted ominously that: 
The interrogation team is certain that [Zubaydah] has additional information that he 
refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is withholding information regarding terrorist 
networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to 
conduct attacks within the United States or against our interests overseas. . . .  
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a person highly trained in resistance to interrogation, would not divulge such 
information to his CIA interrogators.7  The CIA concluded that Zubaydah was 
reinforced in this refusal by his belief that the CIA would not harm him to obtain 
it.8 
The CIA devised a program of steadily escalating violence to persuade 
Zubaydah that any continued refusal to divulge the information sought would result 
in imminent physical harm.9  In anticipation of the possible criminal prosecution of 
any person authorizing or engaging in torture of Zubaydah to so convince him, the 
then Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales, and John Rizzo, the then Acting 
General Counsel of the CIA, sought formal legal advice from the attorneys in the 
Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice about the scope of 
permissible use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” to be employed upon 
Zubaydah (and, by inference, upon other “enemy combatants” held in the custody 
of United States).  
In response, the OLC prepared two legal memoranda, signed by now United 
States Court of Appeals Judge Jay S. Bybee, both dated August 1, 2002.  These 
“Bybee Memoranda” (which have come also to be known as the “torture memos”) 
advised Messrs. Gonzales and Rizzo (and thereby, their principals) about the limits 
of executive power in the United States — and, specifically, about the scope of the 
power of the executive to harshly interrogate captured enemy combatants.  
The first of these so-called “Torture Memoranda” of August 1, 2002 (“the 
Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum”), advised Gonzales that otherwise illegal orders by 
the President of the United States to torture an enemy combatant might be justified 
by reason of the doctrines of necessity and self-defense.10 In any case, the OLC 
concluded that binding the actions of the President of the United States (or his 
                                                                                                     
Moreover, your intelligence indicates that there is currently a level of “chatter” equal to 
that which preceded the September 11 attacks.  
Id. at 1. 
 7. Id. In the Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, the OLC summarized the stated belief by his CIA 
interrogators that “Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of treatment and displays no 
signs of willingness to disclose further information. . . .” Id. at 1. 
 8. Id. at 15. In the Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, the OLC memorialized that “[a]s we understand it; 
based on his treatment so far, Zubaydah has come to expect that no physical harm will be done to him.” 
Id. 
 9. In the Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, the OLC introduced its analysis of the planned enhanced 
interrogation of Zubaydah by stating “you would like to employ ten techniques that you believe will 
dislocate his expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive and encourage him to 
disclose the crucial information mentioned above.” Id. at 1-2.  The OLC understood that, “[b]y using 
these techniques in increasing intensity and in rapid succession, the goal would be to dislodge this 
expectation.” Id. at 15. 
 10. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to  Alberto Gonzales, 
Attorney General, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf [hereinafter “Bybee-
Gonzales Memorandum”]: 
We . . . believe that under the current circumstances certain justification defenses might 
be available that would potentially eliminate criminal liability. Standard criminal law 
defenses of necessity and self-defense could justify interrogation methods needed to 
elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United States and its 
citizens. 
 Id. 
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delegates) in conduct of the War on Al Qaeda to laws proscribing torture would be 
“unconstitutional.”11    
The second Bybee Memorandum of August 1, 2002 (the “Bybee-Rizzo 
Memorandum”), considered whether the finely detailed particulars of anticipated 
violence to be inflicted by the CIA on Zubaydah would violate the prohibition 
against torture found at Section 2340A of title 18 of the United States Code.12  The 
Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum essentially authorized a plan of escalating violence that 
was described as beginning with sleep deprivation and confinement in a box with 
vermin. After slapping Zubaydah’s face and banging his head against a specially 
constructed wall, the OLC-endorsed enhanced interrogation was expected to reach 
its dénouement by means of an ancient practice known as “waterboarding.”13  
Waterboarding is a form of torture that for centuries has been widely condemned.14  
                                                                                                     
 11. Id. In the Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum, the OLC opined unequivocally that:  
Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would 
violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the 
President. . . . Congress can no more interfere with the President’s conduct of the 
interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on 
the battlefield. Just as statutes that order the President to conduct warfare in a certain 
manner or for specific goals would be unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to 
prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent 
attacks upon the United States.  
Id. at 39. 
 12. Section 2340A makes it a criminal offense for any person “outside of the United States to 
commit, or attempt, to commit torture . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006).  Section 2340(1) defines 
torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) 
upon another person within his custody or physical control . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006).  
 13. In the Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, the OLC described “waterboarding” as follows:  
[Y]ou would like to use a technique called the “waterboard.”  In this procedure, the 
individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, which is approximately four feet by 
seven feet.  The individual’s feet are generally elevated.  A cloth is placed over the 
forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner.  As this is 
done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth.  Once the cloth is 
saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air flow is slightly restricted for 20 
to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth.  This causes an increase in carbon 
dioxide level in the individual’s blood.  This increase in the carbon dioxide level 
stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception 
of “suffocation and incipient panic,” i.e., the perception of drowning.  The individual 
does not breathe any water into his lungs.  During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is 
continuously applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches.  After this period, 
the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four 
full breaths.  The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the 
cloth.  The procedure may then be repeated.  The water is usually applied from a 
canteen cup or small watering can with a spout.  You have orally informed us that this 
procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of drowning that the individual 
cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning.  You have 
also orally informed us that it is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 
minutes in any one application.  
Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, supra note 5, at 4. 
 14. See Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1 (2008).  
Professor Clark has provided numerous examples to support the conclusion that waterboarding has been 
consistently considered to be torture in the courts of the United States: 
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The stated goal of using enhanced interrogation techniques in increasing 
intensity and in rapid succession was to dislodge Zubaydah’s expectation that no 
physical harm would be done to him.  The OLC unambiguously found that the 
ultimate use of the waterboard would accomplish this goal by creating a threat of 
imminent death—a predicate act under Section 2340A.15  The OLC concluded, 
nevertheless, that “using the . . . [specified] procedures and culminating in the 
waterboard” would not violate Section 2340A because “not only must the course of 
conduct be a predicate act [i.e. torture], but also those who use the procedure must 
actually cause prolonged mental harm.”16 
The waterboarding of Zubaydah is known to have commenced in August 
2002.17  According to, among others, former Director of the CIA Michael Hayden 
and former Vice President Richard Cheney, information crucial to the defense of 
the United States was acquired as a result of the use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques on Zubaydah.18  Despite reported success, the practice of waterboarding 
                                                                                                     
American courts and other tribunals [have] consistently branded waterboarding 
“torture.” The United States prosecuted members of the Japanese armed forces after 
World War II, in part because they used waterboarding as a form of torture.  Moreover, . 
. . courts have called waterboarding torture when used by domestic law enforcement. 
The United States . . . court-martialed at least one of its own military officers for 
employing waterboarding during the occupation of the Philippines at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. 
Id. at 8. See also Walter Pincus, Waterboarding Historically Controversial: In 1947, the U.S. Called It a 
War Crime; in 1968, It Reportedly Caused an Investigation, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2006, at A17; Eric 
Weiner, Waterboarding: A Tortured History, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Nov. 3, 2007, http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=15886834; Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of 
Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468 (2007) (discussing the history of water 
torture in U.S. case law including United States v. Sawada); THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, 5 L. REP. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948) (regarding the 1942 Doolittle raid on 
Tokyo, some of the Doolittle raiders were captured and questioned using water torture, that torture was 
included in charges against the Japanese officers); United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 
1984) (involving a Texas sheriff convicted on federal charges after being accused of using water torture 
to secure a confession); Scott Shane, Distinctions: Torture Versus War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at 
WK1 (noting that “[w]aterboarding, [is a] near-drowning method with a pedigree stretching back to the 
Spanish Inquisition”).  
 15. The predicate acts under Section 2340A include: “(1) the intentional or threatened infliction of 
severe physical pain or suffering; . . . (3) the threat of imminent death . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(A)-(D) 
(2006). The Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum forthrightly conceded that: “We find that the use of the 
waterboard constitutes a threat of imminent death. . . .   Accordingly, it . . .  fulfills the predicate act 
requirement under the statute.” Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, supra note 5, at 15.  
 16. Id. at 16. 
 17. Zubaydah was subjected to waterboarding “at least 83 times in August 2002” while Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed, another prisoner identified as a senior member of Al Qaeda and one of the planners 
of the 9/11 attacks, was subjected to waterboarding 183 times in March 2003 (his first month in 
custody). Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to John 
A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (May 30, 2005) at 37, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memo-bradbury2005.pdf.  Two months after the Bybee Memoranda 
were issued, a Defense Department lawyer, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, also approved enhanced 
interrogation techniques, including “[t]he use of a wet towel to induce the  misperception of suffocation, 
provided that there [was] a legitimate national security objective.” David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, 
and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1454-55 (2005). 
 18. On April 19, 2009, General Hayden had the following exchange with Chris Wallace on the 
television program Fox News Sunday: 
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was discontinued by the CIA in the spring of 2003 for reasons stated by former 
CIA Director Hayden to be unrelated to the legality of this enhanced interrogation 
technique.19  
If not excused or legally justified, orders to waterboard persons held in the 
custody of the United States violated various provisions of domestic and 
international law that proscribe torture.20  The Bybee Memoranda are now 
                                                                                                     
HAYDEN:  . . . [I]n September 2006, President Bush gave a speech on the Abu 
Zubaydah case.  He pointed out that he — Zubaydah gave us nominal information, 
probably more valuable than he thought. He clammed up. The decision was made to use 
techniques.  After that decision was made and the techniques were used, he gave up 
more valuable information, including the information that led to the arrest of Ramzi 
Binalshibh. . . .  [W]e stand by our story.  The critical information we got from Abu 
Zubaydah came after we began the EITs.  
WALLACE: The EIT?  
HAYDEN: The enhanced interrogation techniques. 
Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace (Fox television broadcast Apr. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,517158,00.html.  On May 10, 2009, former Vice President 
Cheney appeared on Face the Nation, where he said the following: 
[T]he process we had in place produced from certain key individuals, such as Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, two of the three who were waterboarded, and 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the man who killed 3,000 Americans on 9/11, blew up the 
World Trade Center, attacked the Pentagon, tried to blow up the White House or the 
Capitol building. . . .  He did not cooperate fully in terms of interrogations until after 
waterboarding.  Once we went through that process, he produced vast quantities of 
invaluable information about Al Qaeda.  
Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast May 10, 2009), available at  http://www.cqpolitics.com/ 
wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003114272. 
 19. According to Michael Hayden, former Director of the CIA, the CIA, on his orders, ceased all 
waterboarding in the spring of 2003, as evidenced from the following exchange: 
HAYDEN:  But keep in mind, waterboarding had not been using [sic] since the spring 
of 2003.  Waterboarding was one of the techniques that I took off the table formally and 
officially when I became director and reshaped the program.  
WALLACE:  Because you thought it was torture?  
HAYDEN:  No. I reshaped the program because the legal landscape had changed, the 
operational landscape had changed, and we knew more about Al Qaeda, all right, and 
the sense of threat under which we were operating had changed.”  
Fox News Sunday, supra note 18. 
 20. Establishing the illegality of waterboarding, and other conceded actions that inflicted agony on 
persons for the purpose of coercing the disclosure of information, is not the principal focus of this paper. 
The amorphous and myriad provisions of domestic and international law that proscribe torture will not 
be analyzed in depth. Those provisions are necessarily considered here only for their relevance to the 
issues at hand. For purposes of this article, the illegality of waterboarding as torture is presupposed 
based, in part, on the opinion of the present Attorney General of the United States. At his confirmation 
hearing, Attorney General Eric Holder testified as follows: 
LEAHY:  Thank you, Mr. Holder. . . .  Water boarding has been recognized to be 
torture since the time of Spanish Inquisition. . . . [T]he two most recent nominees to 
serve as attorney general of the United States hedged on the question of water boarding.  
They would not say that if an American were water boarded by some other government 
or terrorist anywhere in the world, whether it would be torture and illegal.  They 
maintained it would depend upon the circumstances.  Do you agree with me that water 
boarding is torture and illegal? 
HOLDER:  . . .  I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, water boarding is torture. 
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infamous and have been disavowed by the OLC, in certain (but certainly not all) 
important particulars.21  
In response to challenges concerning the legality of waterboarding and other 
techniques to coerce cooperation by persons captured and detained in conduct of 
the “War on Al Qaeda,” former President George W. Bush and other former 
members of his administration have publicly stated that orders to conduct enhanced 
interrogations were issued only upon and in keeping with advice by the OLC that 
such techniques were lawful.22  
                                                                                                     
LEAHY:  Do you believe that other world leaders would have the authority to authorize 
the torture of United States citizens if they deemed it necessary for their national 
security? 
HOLDER:  No, they would not.  It would violate the international obligations that, I 
think, all civilized nations have agreed to at the Geneva Conventions. 
LEAHY:  Do you believe that the president of the United States has authority to 
exercise a commander-in-chief override and immunize acts of torture?  I ask that 
because we did not get a satisfactory answer from Former Attorney General Gonzales 
on that. 
HOLDER:  Mr. Chairman, no one is above the law.  The president has a constitutional 
obligation to faithfully execute the laws of the United States.  There are obligations that 
we have as a result of treaties that we have signed—obligations, obviously, in the 
Constitution.  Where Congress has passed a law, it is the obligation of the president, or 
the commander-in-chief, to follow those laws. . . .  
If one looks at the various statutes that have been passed, it is my belief that the 
president does not have the power that you’ve indicated. 
LEAHY:  . . . I’m glad to see we now have a nominee for attorney general who is 
unequivocal on this. 
Transcript:  Senate Confirmation Hearings: Eric Holder, Day One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at 11-12, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16text-holder.html?pagewanted=11&_r=1.   
 21. See, e.g., Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to James B. 
Comey, Deputy Attorney General, (Dec. 30, 2004) (regarding legal standards applicable under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/pdf/levin-memo-
123004.pdf. 
 22. On January 7, 2009, President Bush had the following exchange with Brit Hume, on the 
television program Fox News Sunday: 
HUME:  Now, the enhanced interrogation techniques, as some call them—torture, as 
others call them—are being argued over to this hour. . . . Your view of that.  
G.W. BUSH:  My view is that the techniques were necessary and are necessary to be 
used on a rare occasion to get information necessary to protect the American people.  
One such person who gave us information was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.  He was the 
mastermind of the September the 11th, 2001 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people on 
our soil.  And I’m in the Oval Office and I am told that we have captured Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed and the professionals believe he has information necessary to secure the 
country.  So I ask what tools are available for us to find information from him, and they 
gave me a list of tools.  And I said, are these tools deemed to be legal?  And so we got 
legal opinions before any decision was made.  And I think when people study the 
history of this particular episode they’ll find out we gained good information from 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in order to protect our country.  
HUME:  Well, how good and how important? And what’s the—  
G.W. BUSH:  We believe that the information we gained helped save lives on American 
soil.  
HUME:  Can you be more specific than that?  
G.W. BUSH:  Well, I have said in speeches—as a matter of fact, when this program was 
leaked to the press I actually gave a speech that said to the American people, yes, we’re 
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On April 16, 2009, the current President of the United States, Barack Obama, 
expressly promised to forbear prosecution by the United States of those who 
“carried out their duties” to torture Zubaydah and others, so long as they “rel[ied] 
in good faith upon legal advice from the Department of Justice.”23  President 
                                                                                                     
doing this. But I also emphasized we were doing it within the law. . . . Everything this 
administration did was—had a legal basis to it, otherwise we would not have done it.   
Interview of the President and Former President Bush by Brit Hume, Fox News, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090111-1.html.  In a separate 
interview, this time with Matt Lauer of NBC, President Bush asserted that “whatever we have done is 
legal.  That’s what I’m saying.  It’s in the law.  We had lawyers look at it and say, ‘Mr. President, this is 
lawful.’ That’s all I can tell you.”  CQ.com, Newsmaker Transcripts, Sep. 11, 2006, President Bush 
Interviewed on NBC’s “Today Show,” Part 2, available at http://public.cq.com/ public/ 
20060911_topten_2368124.html.  On May 10, 2009, former Vice President Cheney likewise clearly 
asserted that the permissible scope of the enhanced interrogation techniques employed with respect to 
Zubaydah and others was determined by the OLC.  Specifically, former Vice President Cheney said: 
We had captured these people.  We had pursued interrogation in a normal way.  We 
decided that we needed some enhanced techniques.  So we went to the Justice 
Department.  And the controversy has arisen over the opinions written by the Justice 
Department.  The reason we went to the Justice Department wasn’t because we felt we 
were going to take some kind of free hand assault on these people or that we were in the 
torture business.  We weren’t.  And specifically, what we got from the Office of Legal 
Counsel were legal memos that laid out what is appropriate and what’s not appropriate, 
in light of our international commitments.  
Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast May 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/FTN_051009.pdf.  See also Clarke, supra note 14. As Professor 
Clark notes, other members of the Bush administration have claimed reliance on the advice of counsel, 
in terms nearly identical to those used by the former president and vice president: 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has refused to characterize waterboarding as 
torture, insisting that “the determination of whether interrogation techniques are 
consistent with our international obligations and American law are made by the Justice 
Department.” . . . Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also [claims to have] 
deferred to legal interpretations while contending that the United States has not tortured. 
Id. at 2-3. 
 23. Specifically, President Obama said: 
In releasing these memos, it is our intention to assure those who carried out their duties 
relying in good faith upon legal advice from the Department of Justice that they will not 
be subject to prosecution. The men and women of our intelligence community serve 
courageously on the front lines of a dangerous world. 
Press Release, White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of OLC Memos (Apr. 
16, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/statement-of-president-barack-
obama-on-release-of-olc-memos/.  To some extent, President Obama was merely declaring existing law:  
In any . . . criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the Armed 
Forces, or other agent of the United States Government . . . arising out of . . . engaging 
in specific operational practices, that involve detention and interrogation of aliens who 
the President or his designees have determined are believed to be engaged in or 
associated with international terrorist activity that poses a serious, continuing threat to 
the United States, its interests, or its allies, and that were officially authorized and 
determined to be lawful at the time that they were conducted, it shall be a defense that 
such officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know that 
the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not 
know the practices were unlawful. Good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be 
an important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary 
sense and understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1 (Supp. 2008). 
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Obama’s formal statement scrupulously avoided clarifying a potential ambiguity 
created by limiting his promise of immunity to those who “relied” on legal advice. 
On April 19, 2009, President Obama’s Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, 
suggested that President Obama’s promise to forbear prosecution would extend to 
those who “devised” the plan of torture, presumably including policymakers and 
those attorneys who advised and assisted them.24  But, on April 21, 2009, President 
Obama refused to rule out taking action against those who “formulated legal 
decisions” to employ enhanced interrogation techniques, leaving the matter to 
Attorney General Eric Holder.25  
                                                                                                     
 24. During an appearance on ABC’s “This Week,” White House Chief of Staff Emanuael had the 
following exchange with George Stephanopoulos: 
Stephanopoulos: The president has ruled out prosecution for CIA officials who believed 
they were following the law.  Does he believe that the officials who devised the policies 
should be immune from prosecution? 
Emanuel: He believes that, look, as you saw in that statement he wrote, let’s just take a 
step back.  He came up with this and worked on this for about four weeks.  Wrote that 
statement Wednesday night after he had made his decision and dictated what he wanted 
to see.  And Thursday morning I saw him in the office, he was still editing it.  He 
believes that people in good faith were operating with the guidance they were provided.  
Stephanopoulos: What about those who devised the policy?  
Emanuel: Yeah, but those who devised the policy, he believes that they were, should not 
be prosecuted either.  
This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast Apr. 19, 2009), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerIndex?id=7373892. 
 25. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Won’t Bar Inquiry, or Penalty, on Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2009, at A17.  See also The Gaggle, http://blog.newsweek.com/thegaggle/default.aspx (Apr. 
21, 2009, 12:16 EST).  The author of the Newsweek blog observed that when: 
[a]sked directly about those who gave the legal go-ahead for those tactics, Obama said 
that decision was up to Attorney General Eric Holder and he wouldn’t “prejudge.”  In 
other words, that’s not a firm no.  “With respect to those who formulated those legal 
decisions, I would say that that is going to be more of a decision for the attorney general 
within the perimeters of various laws,” Obama said.  “I don’t want to prejudge that.  I 
think that there are a host of very complicated issues involved there.”  
Id.  Despite a potential ambiguity created by President Obama’s remarks, it is widely believed that the 
prosecution of attorneys who served in the OLC during the Bush administration is unlikely, owing in 
part, ironically, to the appointment of Dawn Johnsen to be the new head of the OLC.  See Jeffrey Rosen, 
Yoo Complete Me, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 2009, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/yoo-
complete-me-0.  Professor Rosen noted: 
No former Bush administration official has been more vilified as a torturing monster 
than John Yoo.  And, for years, one of Yoo’s most severe critics has been former 
Clinton Justice official Dawn Johnsen.  Last April, Johnsen called Yoo a “rogue legal 
adviser,” declaring that the “shockingly flawed content” of one of his notorious memos 
justifying torture—along with the “horrific acts it encouraged . . . all demand our 
outrage.”  Her attacks were so fervent, in fact, that Mother Jones branded her the “anti-
Yoo.”  Now, in a novelistic turn, the anti-Yoo will be responsible for defending her bete 
noir. [One of Johnson’s] main responsibilities will be to decide . . . whether to prosecute 
or investigate Yoo’s OLC for issuing the torture memos . . . .  The issue hinges on 
whether giving . . . erroneous legal advice should be a criminal offense. . . .  Johnsen 
and the Justice Department have made clear that Yoo . . . should not be prosecuted. . . . 
Yoo should be relieved, rather than apprehensive, that the OLC will soon be headed by 
the woman who has declared that his “bogus constitutional arguments for outlandishly 
expansive presidential power” demand nothing less than “outrage.”  Although she may 
not be John Yoo’s best friend, she could turn out to be his best defender.  
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John Choon Yoo is widely reported to have been the principal author of the 
Bybee Memoranda.26  He is now a Professor of Law at the University of California, 
Berkeley, School of Law (Berkeley Law).  Professor Yoo continues to defy the 
many critics of the opinions he rendered concerning the scope of presidential power 
while a member of the OLC.27  In the teeth of intense criticism about the torture of 
detainees carried out with his imprimatur, he has not only defended, but expanded 
his views about presidential power, in numerous public fora.28  
Prompted by calls for the termination of Professor Yoo’s employment by 
Berkeley Law, Dean Christopher Edley released the following statement, first in 
2008, and then, as amended, again in 2009: 
There are important questions about the content of the Yoo memoranda, about 
                                                                                                     
Id. at 8.  
 26. See Luban, supra note 17, at 1456 (stating that “Professor Yoo [was] the principal author of the 
Bybee Memo . . . “);  Neil A. Lewis, Official Defends Signing Interrogation Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
29, 2009, at A12 (stating that “John Yoo . . . at the Office of Legal Counsel . . . is generally believed to 
have been the memorandums’ principal author, [and] has defended them regularly.”); Tim Golden, 
Domestic Surveillance: The Advocate; A Junior Aide Had a Big Role In Terror Policy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 2005, at A1.  Golden reports: 
While a mere deputy assistant attorney general in the legal counsel office, Mr. Yoo was 
a primary author of a series of legal opinions on the fight against terrorism, including 
one that said the Geneva Conventions did not apply and at least two others that 
countenanced the use of highly coercive interrogation techniques on terror suspects.  
Id.;  Times Topics, C.I.A. Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/central_intelligence_agency/cia_inte
rrogations/index.html?scp=3&sq=secret%20overseas%20Yoo&st=cse.  The article summarizes the 
provenance of one of the key Bybee Memoranda, as follows:  
At one point [during the] summer [of 2002], current and former intelligence officials 
have said, C.I.A. lawyers ordered that the use of [enhanced interrogation] techniques by 
C.I.A. personnel be suspended until the Justice Department formally authorized them. 
That authorization came in a secret memo dated Aug. 1, 2002, written by John Yoo, a 
legal advisor in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and signed by Jay S. 
Bybee, head of the office. 
Id. 
 27. Professor Yoo wrote, following the recent release of OLC Memoranda by President Obama:  
In releasing these memos, the Obama administration may be attempting to appease its 
antiwar base — which won’t bother to read the memos in full — or trying to look good 
for the chattering classes. . . .  But if the administration chooses to seriously pursue 
those officials who were charged with preparing for the unthinkable, today’s 
intelligence and military officials will no doubt hesitate to fully prepare for those 
contingencies in the future.  President Obama has said he wants to “look forward” rather 
than “backwards.”  If so, he should not restore risk aversion as the guiding principle of 
our counterterrorism strategy. 
John Yoo, Yes, We did Plan for Mumbai-Style Attacks in the U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2009, at A11. 
 28. In a 2005 debate, Professor Yoo responded as follows when asked the following questions by 
Doug Cassel, a Professor of Law at Notre Dame: 
Doug Cassel:  If the president deems that he’s got to torture somebody, including by 
crushing the testicles of the person’s child, there is no law that can stop him?  
John Yoo:  No treaty.  
Doug Cassel:  Also no law by Congress—that is what you wrote in the August 2002 
memo [while Yoo was a Justice Department attorney]. 
John Yoo: I think it depends on why the president thinks he needs to do that. 
http://rwor.org/audio/yoo%20excerpt.mp3 (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). 
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tortured definitions of “torture,” about how he and his colleagues conceived their 
role as lawyers, and about whether and when the Commander in Chief is subject to 
domestic statutes and international law.  As a legal matter, the test here is [whether 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo] commi[tted] . . .  a criminal act which 
has led to conviction in a court of law and which clearly demonstrates unfitness to 
continue as a member of the faculty. . . .  Did the writing of the memoranda, and 
his related conduct, violate a criminal or comparable statute?  
  Absent very substantial evidence on these questions, no university worthy of 
distinction should even contemplate dismissing a faculty member. That standard 
has not been met.29  
Beyond calls for Professor Yoo’s dismissal from his current employment, 
indictment of Professor Yoo for crimes arising out of the advice that led to the 
torture of persons in the custody of the United States has been considered by a 
court in Spain.30  He yet may be sanctioned by the Justice Department’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), but it is unlikely.31  The OPR might suggest 
                                                                                                     
 29. Press Release, Christopher Edley, Jr., The Honorable William H. Orrick, Jr. Distinguished Chair 
and Dean, UC Berkeley School of Law, The Torture Memos and Academic Freedom (Apr. 10, 2008), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/news/2008/edley041008.html. See also infra note 123. 
 30. Paul Haven, Spanish Court Considers Trying Former U.S. Officials, ABC NEWS, March 29, 
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=7198396.  ABC News reported: 
A Spanish court has agreed to consider opening a criminal case against six former Bush 
administration officials, including former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, over 
allegations they gave legal cover for torture at Guantanamo Bay, a lawyer in the case 
said Saturday.  Human rights lawyers brought the case before leading anti-terror judge 
Baltasar Garzon, who agreed to send it on to prosecutors to decide whether it had merit, 
Gonzalo Boye, one of the lawyers who brought the charges, told The Associated Press.  
The ex-Bush officials are Gonzales; former undersecretary of defense for policy 
Douglas Feith; former Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff David Addington; 
Justice Department officials John Yoo and Jay S. Bybee; and Pentagon lawyer William 
Haynes. 
Id. 
 31. See Michael Isikoff, A Torture Report Could Spell Big Trouble for Bush Lawyers, NEWSWEEK, 
Feb. 14, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/184801. Newsweek  reported: 
An internal Justice Department report on the conduct of senior lawyers who approved 
waterboarding and other harsh interrogation tactics is causing anxiety among former Bush 
administration officials.  H. Marshall Jarrett, chief of the [Justice Department’s] ethics 
watchdog unit, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), confirmed last year he was 
investigating whether the legal advice in crucial interrogation memos “was consistent with 
the professional standards that apply to Department of Justice attorneys.” 
Id. at 9.  However, the Wall Street Journal more recently reported that “[t]he final [OPR] report is 
expected to preserve the core findings of earlier drafts, people familiar with the matter said.  Those 
drafts . . . recommended against criminal prosecution, these people said.”  Evan Perez, Justice Likely to 
Urge No Prosecutions, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A4.  At present,  the final report by the OPR has 
not been released.  In an August 2009 statement, Attorney General Holder suggested that, contrary to 
prior reports in the press, prosecutions may be recommended.  Specifically, he said: 
The Office of Professional Responsibility has now submitted to me its report regarding 
the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda related to so-called enhanced interrogation 
techniques. . . . Among other findings, the report recommends that the Department 
reexamine previous decisions to decline prosecution in several cases related to the 
interrogation of certain detainees. 
Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of 
Certain Detainees (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj/gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-
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that he be disciplined by other professional organizations, such as the Pennsylvania 
Bar Association, but this too seems unlikely.32 
Professor Yoo stands out as the most vocal and unmoved representative of the 
Bush administration’s OLC and the most responsible individual for its stance on 
enhanced interrogation techniques.33  Furthermore, he stands out as well owing to 
an impression of vindication arising out of the total absence of an accounting of his 
influence on the conduct of the CIA interrogators and others by any court,  quasi-
judicial agency, state university, professional association, or private institution.  
III.  THE CULPABILITY OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT 
Implausible as it may appear on first impression, it is plain that the reliance on 
the advice of counsel would be the basis for the planned defense against any 
prosecution of former President Bush for illegal torture carried out upon his 
command authority.34  Former President Bush has expressly and repeatedly 
                                                                                                     
0908241.html.  However, the Attorney General promised that any probes in preparation for prosecutions 
will not target those who in “good faith” committed torture prescribed by the attorneys of the OLC: 
The men and women in our intelligence community perform an incredibly important 
service to our nation, and they often do so under difficult and dangerous circumstances.  
They deserve our respect and gratitude for the work they do.  Further, they need to be 
protected from legal jeopardy when they act in good faith and within the scope of legal 
guidance.  That is why I have made it clear in the past that the Department of Justice 
will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal 
guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees.  
I want to reiterate that point today, and to underscore the fact that this preliminary 
review will not focus on those individuals. 
Id. 
 32. The final report by the OPR is expected to call on state bar associations to carry out sanctions, 
including disbarment of the  OLC lawyers.  See Perez, supra note 31.  See generally Marissa Lopez, 
Professional Responsibility: Tortured Independence in The Office of Legal Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REV. 
685 (2005) (considering possible violations of ethical standards by OLC attorneys). As pointed out on 
the Wall Street Journal’s Law Blog, however, this recommendation may be an idle gesture: “Judge 
Bybee is a member of the Washington, D.C., bar.  If disbarred, Bybee could remain on the bench unless 
impeached by Congress.  Federal judges do not have to be members of the bar to be nominated to the 
federal bench, at any level, including on the Supreme Court.”  Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
(May 7, 2009, 09:42 EST).  And, it appears that Professor Yoo’s status as a member of the bar is 
unlikely to be affected by any OPR recommendation, because “the five-year statute of limitations for 
allegations of attorney misconduct in Pennsylvania, where Yoo is licensed to practice law, has expired.  
That makes it unlikely the state bar will take up an ethics inquiry into his work at the Justice 
Department, which he left in 2003.”  Carrie Johnson, Amid Scrutiny, Yoo Pushes Back: Quietly but 
Forcefully, Author of Detainee Memos Rebuts Critics, WASH. POST, Jul. 27, 2009, at A3. 
 33. “In many ways, Yoo . . . has become the face of what critics see as the Bush era’s legal 
overreaching — all tied to memos written from 2001 to 2003 spelling out his expansive views of 
interrogation, electronic surveillance and the deployment of soldiers on U.S. soil . . . .”  Id. 
 34. For the purpose of this inquiry, the derivative command responsibility of executive officers and 
other members of the Bush administration for acts of subordinates that constituted illegal torture during 
their terms in office is presupposed.  As president, George W. Bush had a nondelegable duty to 
faithfully execute the laws of the United States.  See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer wrote:  
Article II makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch 
in much the same way that the entire Congress is responsible for the actions of the 
Legislative Branch, or the entire Judiciary for those of the Judicial Branch. . . . The 
Founders created this equivalence . . . in order to focus, rather than to spread, Executive 
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asserted that “enhanced interrogation techniques” employed to coerce information 
from persons in the custody of the United States were sparingly conducted, and 
conducted only upon and in keeping with advice obtained from duly appointed 
legal counsel to the President of the United States.35 
On first impression, a personal belief by the former president in the legality of 
proscribed conduct, based on the opinion of learned counsel, would seem irrelevant 
to any prosecution for violation of criminal law.36  It is said: “Ignorance of the law 
is no excuse.”37  The maxim is so time-honored that even children repeat and 
                                                                                                     
responsibility thereby facilitating accountability. . . . [A] President, though able to 
delegate duties to others, cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation 
to supervise that goes with it. 
Id. at 712-13.  In addition to constructive responsibility, actual authorization of the use of enhanced 
interrogation techniques by former President Bush, after obtaining legal advice from the Justice 
Department, has been established.  See, e.g., Face the Nation, supra note 22.  This is apparent based on 
the following exchange between former Vice President Richard Cheney and Bob Schieffer of CBS 
News: 
CHENEY:  If we had been about torture, we wouldn’t have wasted our time going to 
the Justice Department.  
SCHIEFFER:  How much did President Bush know specifically about the methods that 
were being used? We know that you—and you have said—that you approved this . . . .  
CHENEY:  Right.  
SCHIEFFER: . . . [S]omewhere down the line.  Did President Bush know everything 
you knew?  
CHENEY:  I certainly, yes, have every reason to believe he knew—he knew a great 
deal about the program.  He basically authorized it.  I mean, this was a presidential-level 
decision.  And the decision went to the president.  He signed off on it.  
Id. at 4-5. 
 35. The defense of “advice of counsel” is distinguishable from reasonable reliance upon the 
assurance of government officials that one’s conduct will be lawful.  See, e.g., Marty Lederman, posting 
to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/ (Feb. 8, 2008, 03:33 EST). See also State v. Jacobson, 681 
N.W.2d 398, 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“Many jurisdictions, including Minnesota, have recognized 
the defense of good-faith reliance on an official interpretation of the law, including official actions or 
pronouncements regarding a criminal charge.”).  The president, however, uniquely stands in relation to 
the attorney general as a superior officer, and, despite claims to independence, it is clear that “[t]he 
assistant attorney general of OLC is a political appointee and thus necessarily ‘philosophically attuned’ 
to the administration’s policies.”  Note, The Immunity-Conferring Power of the Office of Legal Counsel, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 2086, 2088 (2008).  Thus, notwithstanding whether inferior officers may estop 
government prosecution based on assurances of prospective legality, the better-reasoned view is that the 
president cannot estop the Justice Department or an independent prosecutor based on a claim of 
reasonable reliance on opinions that were shaped by the president’s own policy imperatives.  Similarly, 
the defense of advice of counsel must be distinguished from the so-called “Nuremberg defense”—or the 
claim to have been justified by reason of following orders.  Clearly, this defense would not be available 
to the former President of the United States. Ironically, the official policy of the current President of the 
United States, by absolving those who relied in good faith on the opinions of the OLC, supplants the 
Nuremberg defense with the defense of claimed reliance on the advice of counsel, placing the views of 
the OLC above those of the president in immunity-conferring force and effect. 
 36. Id. at 2087 (stating too broadly that, “ [i]n the private lawyer context, a defendant who acts 
illegally cannot invoke an advice-of-counsel defense”).  
 37. Id. at 2092 (stating that “ignorance of the law or a mistake as to the law’s requirements is 
generally not a defense to criminal conduct.”). There is a clear difference between the intent to do an act 
and cognizance that that act is in violation of the law.  The “ignorance” maxim is typically applied to 
reject a claim of exculpation in the latter instance. For example, in United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 
419, 426 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be convicted of violating a statute 
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understand it.  This maxim suggests the untenable nature of any defense by former 
President Bush based on OLC advice that contemplated action on his orders would 
comply with law. 
The law, however, is nearly never as simplistic as a childish maxim might 
suggest.  To be sure, the “ignorance” maxim might spring from the mouths of 
judges.  But like so many other time-honored principles of law, the “ignorance” 
maxim is not as inflexible as it may seem on first impression.  When ignorance of 
the law compels one to seek the advice of someone who is not—an attorney—
reliance in good faith upon the advice of that counsel, perhaps surprisingly, is 
sometimes relevant to criminal responsibility.38  
A reason for recognizing this excuse finds some support in the words of Justice 
Robert H. Jackson, writing for majority of the United States Supreme Court in 
Morissette v. United States39:  
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by 
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in 
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent 
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.40 
It is with respect to this somewhat idealistic notion of criminal responsibility—
                                                                                                     
prohibiting the purchase of food stamps at less than face value because he did not know that his conduct 
was prohibited by law.  In dissent, Justice White wrote that “the [majority] ignores the . . . well founded 
assumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse.”  Id. at 441.  Justice White further noted that 
“knowingly to do something that is unauthorized by law is not the same as doing something knowing 
that it is unauthorized by law.”  Id. at 436. 
 38. Significantly, the Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum relied in part on Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135 (1994).  In Ratzlaf, the United States Supreme Court required proof of knowledge of illegality 
in a prosecution for illegally structuring a currency transaction.  The Court noted that the element of 
intent to cause a particular unlawful result “might be negated by . . . proof that [the] defendant relied in 
good faith on advice of counsel.” Id. at 142 n.10.  The Fifth Circuit generally finds that the reliance of 
the advice of counsel is relevant to the element of  wilfulness: 
As a defense reliance on counsel is . . . relevant to establishing whether a person knows 
his or her actions are illegal.  Presumably, if a lawyer instructs a client that a specific 
course of action is legal, evidence of such instruction is relevant when determining 
whether the client willfully violated the law.  
United States  v. Adeyinka, 205 Fed.Appx. 238, 241 (5th Cir. 2006). Reliance on counsel is usually 
viewed, however, as an affirmative defense.  See United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 
2002).  As such, it is “an assertion more positive and specific than a general denial of criminal intent.”  
United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 270 (D.C. Cir.  1989). 
 39. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
 40. Id. at 250.  The “choice between good and evil” to which Justice Jackson alluded corresponds 
with the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea—translated “an act does not make one 
guilty unless his mind is guilty.”  Comment, United States v. Nofziger and the Revision of 18 U.S.C. § 
207: The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements of Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 803, 813 n.51 (1990).  In the United States, mens rea is a bedrock principle of law and 
“[a]bsent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, courts should presume mens rea is required” before 
imposing criminal sanctions. Id. at 808 (quoting United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452 (D.C. Cir. 
1989)).  See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (“The existence of a mens rea is the 
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”). 
Despite this importance, however, “[t]he unanimity with which [courts] have adhered to the central 
thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and 
confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element.”  Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.  
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a responsibility that turns on a necessary choice “between [doing] good [or] evil”—
that reliance upon a trained expert in the law becomes salient.41 It is not ignorance 
of the law, according to a better reasoned view, but a mistake of law on matters 
upon which reasonable minds may differ that brings to the fore reliance on the 
advice of counsel.42 These two concepts are analytically antithetical. The former 
presupposes unknowing violation of the law. The latter presupposes reasonable 
reliance upon a mistaken belief in the legitimacy of one’s actions, despite a patent 
putative proscription of those actions by positive law.  
If good reason grounds criminal responsibility on immorally mistaken choices, 
for reasons that are perhaps eminently understandable, reliance on the advice of 
counsel as a defense to criminal charges has been recognized by United States 
courts infrequently, inconsistently, and on only an ad hoc basis.43  Traditionally, 
crimes at common law proscribed inherently inexcusable conduct obviously 
contrary to community norms.44 Thus, cognizance of criminality was not a core 
element of crime, and the advice of counsel could play no role in the determination 
                                                                                                     
 41. See, e.g., Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392 (1986), equating 
freedom with the proscription only of culpable choices: 
To justify punishment, the criminal law traditionally has required that an individual both 
make a wrong choice and commit a wrongful act. . . . The defense of mistake serves to 
insure that the requirement of a wrong choice is met.  The existence of the mistake 
demonstrates that there was no choice to act in a prohibited way even if the action itself 
was wrongful. In the absence of a wrong choice, the moral justification for refusing to 
respect a person’s liberty vanishes.  It is partially through this system of mistake 
defenses that criminal law protects individual liberty.  
Id. at 1393-94. 
 42. One may not commit an act that is patently harmful and contrary to community norms, and yet 
still claim the “advice of counsel” in defense.  See Powers v. Goodwin, 324 S.E.2d 701, 705 n.8 (W.Va. 
1984) (“[S]ome courts have held that the advice must not be so patently erroneous as to be unacceptable 
to a reasonably prudent person.”) (collecting cases).  
 43. There is uncertainty about the defense of reliance on advice of counsel because “[r]eliance on 
advice of counsel as a defense is a subject that does not appear to have been extensively discussed by 
the courts.” Powers, 324 S.E.2d at 705.  Despite the seeming refusal by some courts to recognize the 
defense at all, the general contours of the defense have been established. Generally, the “defense may 
not succeed absent a showing that the accused acted in good faith in seeking advice on the lawfulness of 
the possible future conduct, relied on that advice in good faith, and made a full disclosure of all relevant 
facts to the advisor.”  22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 118 (2008). In United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814 
(7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held: 
In order for this theory to be supported by the evidence, a defendant must establish the 
following elements: (1) before taking action, (2) he in good faith sought the advice of an 
attorney whom he considered competent, (3) for the purpose of securing advice on the 
lawfulness of his possible future conduct, (4) and made a full and accurate report to his 
attorney of all material facts which the defendant knew, (5) and acted strictly in 
accordance with the advice of his attorney who had been given a full report.  
Id. at 823.  It is clear that the Bush administration, and the OLC advising it, took great care to ensure 
that each of these elements was satisfied. 
 44. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945) (“[W]here the punishment imposed 
is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused 
cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of 
law.”).  See also United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135, 660-61 (1994)) (“‘Willful’ criminal conduct is at the very least conduct that no 
‘ordinary person would engage in innocently.’”)  
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of guilt.45  The common law of crimes presumed knowledge of wrongfulness, and 
the failure to acquire that knowledge was considered blameworthy, per se.46   
As the body of law proscribing acts punishable as crimes increased, however, 
the defense of reliance on the advice of counsel developed.  The equities start to 
appear quite different from the common law perspective when examining whether 
a person may be properly punished for a mistaken choice to act in a manner that 
violates a complex or vague law proscribing an unobvious wrong, especially if the 
accused relied in good faith on an attorney’s advice.47  
Unfortunately, the case law does not dependably support a theory that the 
defense of reliance on the advice of counsel may be asserted in prosecutions for 
unapparent wrongs.48  And, the defense may be asserted in some cases that involve 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Note, supra note 41, noting: 
Mistakes of criminal law concern the existence or interpretation of a law that prohibits 
certain kinds of behavior.  While mistakes of fact and of noncriminal law have 
traditionally been defenses in a criminal trial, mistakes of criminal law have not on the 
theory that the knowledge that conduct is prohibited is not itself an element of the 
crime. 
Id. at 1394-95. 
 46. See id., observing that the rationale for imposing punishment in instances of unwitting violation 
of the common law had more saliency because persons were subject to criminal sanctions for fewer 
offenses: 
In the past, this presumption may have been true for the simple reason that the common 
law of crimes closely tracked a relatively homogeneous community’s moral sensibility.  
It was a useful presumption for two reasons: first, without it a strong incentive not to 
know the law might be created; and second, proof of abstract, conceptual legal 
knowledge can be relatively difficult and, additionally, may be unnecessary where there 
is little likelihood that the defendant did not, in fact, know the law. . . . However, in 
modern times, this presumption is largely fictional.  
Id. at 1395-96. 
 47. See e.g., United States v. Impastato, 543 F. Supp. 2d 569, 578 (E.D. La. 2008).  In Impastato, 
the court suggested that the defense of reliance on the advice of counsel may negate the element of 
criminal “willfulness” only in connection with the enforcement of a statute proscribing a “complex” 
offense:  
[T]he lowest level of willfulness requires simply “committing an act, and having 
knowledge of that act,” and under this definition “the defendant need not have known of 
the specific terms of the statute or even the existence of the statute;” instead “[t]he 
defendant’s knowledge that he committed the act is sufficient.” . . . The second or 
“intermediate” level of willfulness “requires the defendant to have known that his 
actions were in some way unlawful,” i.e., that “he was doing a ‘bad’ act under the 
general rules of law,” but it does not require that he knew the specific statute that he 
violated. . . . Finally, “[t]he strictest level of interpretation of criminal willfulness 
requires that the defendant knew the terms of the statute and that he was violating the 
statute.” . . . The Fifth Circuit [has] indicated that this strict level is reserved for 
“complex” statutes. 
Id. at 578 (internal citations omitted). 
 48. There is a “public welfare” exception to the mens rea requirement that permits punishment for a 
class of offenses without proof of a “guilty mind.”  Generally included in this class of “public welfare” 
offenses are violations of general police regulations passed for the safety, health, or well-being of the 
community.  See Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62, 73 (1933).  
See also Comment, Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 70 YALE L.J. 978, 978 n.5 (1961).  Such “police 
regulations” often do not proscribe immediately apparent harms.  
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wrongs that are easily recognized.49  Where the line is drawn between the 
culpability of the ignorant and the excuse of the mistaken is therefore ambiguous.50  
Perhaps all that can be said categorically is that the defense of reliance on the 
advice of counsel is seen in cases where courts excuse criminality based on 
doctrinal precepts that are largely uncategorizable. 
Courts and scholars therefore can be excused for failing to discover an 
underlying principle that harmonizes decisions allowing the defense of reliance on 
the advice of counsel.  Attempts to identify broad theories to explain, and thus 
delimit, the exculpation of criminal conduct based on the grounds of subjective 
belief in legality are entirely unsatisfactory.  Such theories usually rely, to a greater 
or lesser extent, on the murky and relatively modern rationale that the advice of 
counsel negates the mens rea necessary to impose criminal punishment, i.e., the 
culpable “choice” to do wrong that justifies punishment to which Justice Jackson 
alluded in Morissette.51  
To be sure, it can be observed that offenses that have in common the notion 
that a misapprehension of the law based on legal advice is relevant to criminal 
responsibility appear to share some aspect of perceived moral ambiguity.  Courts 
often resort to unsupportable conclusions about the blameworthiness of the 
defendant’s conduct when deciding whether to allow the defense.52  
                                                                                                     
 49. See United States v. Roti, 484 F.3d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] lawyer’s fully informed 
opinion that certain conduct is lawful (followed by conduct strictly in compliance with that opinion) can 
negate the mental state required for some crimes, including fraud.”).  See also  United States v. 
Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 1980) (willful tax evasion);  King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 
767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (willful patent infringement);  E.E.O.C. v. Rekrem, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 
7239 (CBM), 2002 WL 27776 (S.D.N.Y.  Jan. 10, 2002) (unlawful retaliation under Title VI). 
 50. See Note, supra note 41, noting: 
Since the defense is not required for every crime, the problem is one of determining 
when it is required.  This entails identifying laws that threaten the due process values 
underlying the principle of wrong choice.  This decision, by its very nature, must 
involve balancing and line-drawing that may appear arbitrary.  This is true of many 
other judicial tasks, including that of deciding whether a law is vague or not.  
Id. at 1413. 
 51. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252. 
 52. See United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 778 (5th Cir. 2005).  Ragsdale entered into an 
internet pornography business with the understanding (based on his partner’s report) that a former 
federal prosecutor had assured his partner that the material offered on the website was highly unlikely to 
be found obscene by a court and would be protected by the First Amendment.  Id. at 777.  The Court of 
Appeals rejected the defense, stating “[this crime] does not require that the defendant have knowledge of 
the legal status of the materials, defendant need only know the character and nature of the materials.”  
Id. at 778.  The discussion by the Court about whether the materials had an “obscene” character and 
nature, however, went on for about three pages and was hardly a model of legal clarity.  Moreover, the 
Court in Ragsdale relied heavily on Penthouse Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980), 
another instance of seemingly ambiguous “characterization” of obscene materials.  In the Penthouse 
case, the Fifth Circuit independently found that certain Penthouse and Oui magazines contained patently 
offensive sexual content.  Id. at 1366.  See also Simms v. State, 675 S.W.2d 643 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984).  
Defendant Simms was charged and convicted of “interference with custody [of a minor]” pursuant to a 
statute that required for conviction that she must have acted “knowing that [s]he ha[d] no lawful right to 
do so.”  Id. at 644.  Defendant consulted with her attorney before acting, and she testified that she 
followed her lawyer’s advice.  Id.  She urged on appeal that she lacked the requisite mental state because 
she had sought and relied upon the advice of counsel and believed that her actions were lawful.  Id.  The 
court found that the trial court, acting as the trier of fact and law, dealt with defendant Simms quite 
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Courts are equally apt to allow the defense, however, when the criminality of 
the defendant’s conduct turns on legislative fiat, owing to simple disagreement 
about whether the statute is clear, or, because of doubt about whether the reach of 
the statute is fair and warranted under the circumstances.53  The defense appears to 
be successfully deployed in those cases as an equitable means by which judges can 
qualify or limit criminal responsibility arising under strictly drawn legislation 
proscribing offenses that are unassailable on constitutional or other grounds that 
would otherwise rationalize refusing to give a penal statute its intended effect.54  
Against this backdrop, the Bybee Memoranda were tailor-made to support the 
defense of reliance on the advice of counsel, such as it is. By reference to 
analogous precedent, the Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum persuasively argued that 
necessity and the defense of self (and others) might justify otherwise criminal 
conduct by a public official in times of grave peril to the nation.55  The Bybee 
                                                                                                     
“humanely” by suspending her sentence on conviction of a Class D felony (noting that Simms neglected 
to raise the defense at an earlier stage in the proceeding).  Id. 
 53. See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 681 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).  In that case, it was alleged 
that the defendant engaged various persons to complete and file voter-registration cards that falsely 
listed defendant’s place of business as the voter’s place of residence.  Id. at 401.   Defendant moved to 
dismiss the complaint, arguing that “the statutes prohibiting forgery and unlawful voting are 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant when considered in light of other voting statutes.”  Id.  
Defendant also submitted an affidavit in which he stated that his attorney showed him a copy of a letter 
from a County Attorney to the Assistant Clerk and Director of Elections, concerning an investigation 
into alleged voter registration and election law violations by local police officers.  Id. at 402.  The letter 
contained the County Attorney’s legal opinion that there was no evidence that the officers had violated 
election laws by registering to vote based on their work address rather than their home address.  Id.  
Defendant asserted that “[w]ith [his attorney’s] counsel and advice, and relying on a review of 
Minnesota’s election laws and the letter by [the County Attorney],” he and several of his employees 
“devised a plan to get people to register to vote using [defendant’s place of business] as a residence.”  
Id.  The Court found that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to assert as defenses 
both the advice of counsel and reliance on an official interpretation of the law.  Id. at 410. 
 54. See Note, supra note 41, noting: 
As criminal law began to be used as a tool of the regulatory state, and thus became 
divorced from its common law roots, the question whether proof of mens rea was 
required by either the Constitution or the particular statute in question frequently arose. . 
. . [D]eference to the legislature . . . permits a person to be treated as an object, as a 
means to a social end, without that person first having given up his right to be treated as 
an autonomous subject by making a prohibited choice. 
Id. at 1396.  Some scholars contend, however, that properly viewed, “culpability” is negated by a 
mistake of law, and distinguish that concept from a defense that relates to the mental element of an 
offense.  Thus;  
[t]he mental element relates to the actor’s awareness of the factual elements constituting 
the actus reus of the offense.  That mental state may be negated by a mistake of fact.  
By contrast, the term “culpability” in our context focuses upon the manner in which a 
mistake of the criminal law comes about.   
Miriam Gur-Arye, Reliance on a Lawyer’s Mistaken Advice—Should it be an Excuse from Criminal 
Liability?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 464-65 (2002) (arguing that the defense should not be recognized). 
 55. Leaving aside the fact that there is no record of the criminal prosecution of a President of the 
United States for war crimes, there is ample evidence of unchallenged conduct in times of war that 
would amount to criminal conduct if not otherwise justified or excused.  The proposed mistreatment of 
prisoners with the intent to obtain military intelligence necessary to avoid harm to the populace was 
certainly not a novel or absurd notion following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The concept of 
violent action as self-defense to avert immediate danger was defended contemporaneously by diverse 
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Memoranda also created a patina of plausibility about the scope of presidential 
authority in times of crisis that might have been honestly, and thus expulpatorily 
believed by a president who was legitimately fearful of further devastating attacks 
against the United States.  Perhaps most importantly, the OLC analyses were not so 
obviously implausible as to suggest cognizance of malfeasance on the part of the 
president and those following his orders—and recognition of this fact essentially 
has been codified by Congress.56 
Measured by the relevant standards, it is almost inconceivable that the defense 
of reliance on the advice of counsel would not work quite well for former President 
Bush and his subordinate executive officers in these circumstances.  Ironically, the 
OLC anticipated precisely the argument that would most successfully appeal to the 
sensibilities of a former professor of law assuming the office of the presidency.  
For if it is the case that “mature systems of law” will find only a choice to do “evil” 
punishable as crime, then punishing conduct blessed by a suite of attorneys in the 
prosaic legalisms of the OLC would not seem to fit the bill.  
Moreover, attempting to base the alleged criminality of the former president’s 
commands to torture on a “choice” to do “evil” would truly fail to fully 
comprehend the “lesser evil” of behavior that, albeit proscribed by law, plausibly 
was sincerely intended to accomplish a greater good and undertaken upon finely 
crafted legal advice.   
As presently known, former President Bush ordered the torture of Zubaydah 
and others after obtaining scholarly and supposedly authoritative legal advice 
supporting his choices, through the proper channels of the government.  At least 
publicly, the former Commander-in-Chief and other members of his administration 
have claimed the “advice of counsel” defense in anticipation of any possible charge 
of illegal torture of enemy combatants in the custody of the United States.57  It is 
likely that this anticipatory defense will successfully preclude the trial of the former 
president and his delegates on any such charges, just as it has excused the CIA 
operatives who conducted the subject torture. 
IV.  THE CULPABILITY OF ATTORNEYS WHO SERVED IN THE OLC DURING THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION  
As shown above, reliance by former President Bush upon the advice of the 
OLC very well might provide the basis for a forceful defense against any 
                                                                                                     
legal scholars, and has been defended ever since.  See, e.g., Steve Inskeep, Rules Should Govern 
Torture, Dershowitz Says, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, June 27, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=5512634&from=mobile.  Professor Alan Dershowitz of the Harvard Law School has 
argued: 
If the [P]resident of the United States thinks it’s absolutely essential to defend the lives 
of thousands of people, he ought to be on the line. He ought to have to sign a torture 
warrant in which he says, “I’m taking responsibility for breaking the law, for violating 
treaties, for doing an extraordinary act of necessity.” That’s a responsibility only the 
president should be able to take, and only in the most extraordinary situation. 
Id.  For contrary views, see, e.g., infra notes 76 and 78; Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the 
OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. OF NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455 (2005) (examining whether the 
defenses were plausibly asserted).  
 56. See supra note 23. 
 57. See supra note 22. 
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prosecution for illegal torture of enemy combatants during his administration.  
Exculpation without trial of the attorneys who counseled the Executive Branch 
about the limits of legally permissible conduct will eliminate entirely judicial 
strutiny of the arguably illegal conduct that gained advantage from their 
imprimatur. 
Under the laws of the United States, there are several theories upon which an 
indictment of the attorneys who served in the OLC during the Bush administration 
might be based.  Each would test the limits of ascribing criminality to the advisor, 
rather than to the advised. The most tenable of such theories involves accomplice 
liability, or “aiding and abetting” the crime of torture.58  
Although the attorney-advisors to the Bush administration did not conduct or 
directly participate in the putatively illegal torture of Zubaydah and others,59 the 
absence of their physical participation in the subject waterboarding and other 
enhanced interrogation techniques is completely irrelevant to assessing their 
                                                                                                     
 58. The United States Code holds liable as a principal one who acts to help a criminal venture 
succeed.  For example, section two of title eighteen provides:  
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or 
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. 
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  Some scholars have noted an anomaly in that the two sub-clauses of section two 
have not both expressly referenced the state of mind required for conviction.  See, e.g., Baruch Weiss, 
What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer under Federal 
Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002), positing: 
Presumably, by including the word “willfully” in the causing subsection, and by not 
including it in the aiding and abetting subsection, Congress’s intent was to require 
“willfulness” for the causer, but not for the aider and abettor.  But, both subsections 
provide that the accomplice—whether an aider and abettor or a causer—is to be treated 
as a principal. If an aider and abettor is to be treated as a principal, and a causer is also 
to be treated as a principal, then, by the transitive principle, an aider and abettor and a 
causer would have to be treated as equivalent.  That is a somewhat perplexing result, if 
one need act willfully and the other not. 
Id. at 1361.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2006), which provides, in pertinent part:  
Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that 
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, 
and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, 
induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such 
conduct . . . [may be] punish[ed]. 
Id. 
 59. This point was highlighted by Berkeley Law Dean Christopher Edley, explaining the means by 
which he distinguishes the “morality” of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo’s conduct  from the 
actions of those who strictly followed his express prescriptions circumscribing the “permissible” torture 
of Zubaydah and others:  
As critical as I am of [Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo’s] analyses, no argument 
about what he did or didn’t facilitate, or about his special obligations as an attorney, 
makes his conduct morally equivalent to that of his nominal clients, Secretary 
Rumsfeld, et al., or comparable to the conduct of interrogators distant in time, rank and 
place.  Yes, it does matter that Yoo was an adviser, but President Bush and his national 
security appointees were the deciders.  
Edley, supra note 29. 
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potential criminal responsibility therefor.60  Attorneys who counsel another to 
commit a crime can be and are held liable as accomplices to criminal acts, without 
regard to any actual participation in the actus reus.61  An attorney is not immune 
from prosecution because the conduct of the attorney linked to the commission of a 
crime was limited to providing advice.  
For example, in United States v. Cintolo,62 Attorney Cintolo was charged with 
                                                                                                     
 60. See generally CHARLES E. TORCIA, 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 29 (15th ed. 1993),  Part I. 
General Principles, Chapter 4. Parties, § 29. In general (database updated September 2008).  As that 
treatise explains: 
[T]he terms “aid” and “abet” are frequently used interchangeably, … although they are 
not synonymous. … To “aid” is to assist or help another. … To “abet” means, literally, 
to bait or excite, as in the case of an animal. . . .  In its legal sense, it means to 
encourage, advise, or instigate the commission of a crime. 
Id.  Thus, an actor does not need to be present at the time of commission of a criminal offense to “aid” 
or “abet” it, and “distance” in place and place is mainly irrelevant.  See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 467 
F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir. 1972) (defendant’s participation in theft was limited to providing thieves with 
information about the  location of goods to be stolen, and later, a phone call to claim  a share of the 
proceeds; because the Government did not claim the defendant was physically present at the crime, the 
court found the defendant’s participation amounted to that of an accessory). 
 61. Attorneys may often elude criminal responsibility for advice that leads to the commission of a 
proscribed offense for a variety of reasons, including prosecutorial discretion and the shield of the 
attorney-client privilege.  This has led some to believe in error that potential criminal responsibility for 
merely giving legal advice is enshrined more in principle than in practice.  In fact, however, aiding and 
abetting crime is of real concern among practicing attorneys.  See, e.g., Faye M. Bracey, Twenty-Five 
Years Later—For Better or Worse?, 25 ST MARY’S L.J. 315, 324 (1993) (“Because federal and state 
criminal statutes apply to lawyers as well as nonlawyers, practicing attorneys must ascertain constantly 
whether they or their clients are violating criminal laws. . . .  For example, advising a client involved in 
an ongoing criminal enterprise may constitute aiding and abetting.”) (emphasis added);  David F. 
Axelrod, W. Evan Price II & Justin A. Thornton, Crime Doesn’t Pay—But Counsel, What Every 
Practitioner Needs to Know About Criminal Exposure in the Everyday Practice of Law, CRIM. JUST. 
Fall 1993, at 27, stating: 
The combination of pervasive regulation and expansive criminal statutes covering 
aiding and abetting, conspiracy, false statements, and concealment of felonies can 
ensnare the unwary—and sometimes even the wary-practitioner.  While most 
prosecutors refrain from pursuing attorneys who appear to have acted in good faith, the 
number of reversals of convictions of attorneys suggests that prosecutorial discretion is 
no safe haven in a close case. . . . [Federal law] defines as a “principal” anyone who 
“aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of a crime.  The 
[relevant] statute covers more than just obvious conduct, such as direct assistance in the 
commission of a crime; it reaches so far as to impose criminal liability for merely 
advising a course of action that is later determined to be criminal. 
Id. at 27 (emphasis added). The sanctity of the attorney-client privilege—another threshold barrier that 
often precludes acquiring evidence sufficient to prove the culpability of an attorney-advisor—yields 
entirely in cases that are successfully maintained against attorneys based on “mere advice” rendered to a 
client. For example, in Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953), the court unequivocally 
held that although: 
[t]he purpose of the privilege is to encourage such disclosure of . . . facts [to one’s 
attorney] . . . the interests of public justice further require that no shield such as the 
protection afforded to communications between attorney and client shall be interposed 
to protect a person who takes counsel on how he can safely commit a crime. . . . The 
fact that the aider may be a member of the bar and the attorney for the offender will not 
prevent his becoming an accessory. 
Id. at 347. 
 62. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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rendering advice that led to an illegal refusal to testify by a grand jury witness.63  In 
his defense, Attorney Cintolo argued that the act of providing legal advice was 
lawful, and that inquiry into the motives for his opinions and advice would chill the 
attorney-client relationship and the work of defense attorneys in general.64  The 
court held to the contrary. According to the court, even an act innocuous when 
considered in isolation may be criminal when considered in context: 
Purchasing a chisel at a hardware store is, usually, a lawful act, commonplace in 
the extreme.  Yet, if an individual were to purchase the same chisel at the same 
hardware store with the avowed (evil) purpose that it be used as part of a planned 
break-in by persons in league with him, the iniquitous motive alone would 
transmogrify the innocent transaction into an overt act carrying undeniable 
criminal consequences. . . .  [I]t is lawful—again, commonplace—to offer an 
acquaintance a lift to the airport.  Nevertheless, if a person were to provide such 
transportation at precisely the same time and in precisely the same way, but with 
the corrupt purpose that the prospective passenger be spirited away so as to thwart 
his scheduled appearance before a grand jury, the impure motive alone would 
convert the otherwise-lawful gesture into an outright obstruction of [justice]. 
  That sort of alchemy—the conversion of innocent acts to guilty ones by the 
addition of improper intent—is what this case is all about. In the most fundamental 
sense, the “advice” given by Cintolo in the manipulation of his own client was a 
commodity no different than the chisel or the free ride.  It was legal to traffic in the 
wares, but illegal corruptly to put them to felonious use.65  
In this instance, the opinions that Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo and 
his colleagues provided to the Bush administration were commodities put to an 
arguably felonious use.  The OLC opinions unequivocally assured the president and 
his delegates that the power of the presidency would shield them from criminal 
responsibility.66  A properly instructed finder of fact rightfully could find that the 
OLC gave those assurances for the very real purpose of promoting and facilitating 
the contemplated torture enterprise.67   
                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 983.  The client was held in contempt in federal district court and was sentenced to an 
eighteen month term of incarceration.  Id. at 989.  Attorney Cintolo also offered “to use his position as 
an attorney to shield members of illegal gambling and loansharking enterprises from their just deserts as 
tax evaders.”  Id. at 988 n.4. 
 64. Id. at 990. 
 65. Id. at 993. 
 66. See supra note 10. With respect to the anticipation that the opinions by the OLC would act as a 
talisman to ward off prosecution, the attorneys who wrote them and the actors who used them were 
entirely correct. President Obama has acted according to plan. See also infra Part IV.  
 67. The Model Penal Code provides, in pertinent part: “(3) A person is an accomplice of another 
person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the offense, he . . . (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or 
committing it.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2001).   As the authors noted in United States v. Nofziger 
and the Revision of 18 U.S.C. § 207, the view that an accomplice acts with the “purpose” to facilitate the 
crime is derived in no small measure from Judge Learned Hand’s oft-cited opinion that traditional 
definitions of accomplice liability have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden 
result would follow upon the accessory’s conduct;  “. . . they all demand that he in some sort associate 
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something he wishes to bring about, that he seek 
by his action to make it succeed.  All of the words used—even the most colorless, ‘abet’—carry an 
implication of purposive attitude towards it.”  
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The OLC certainly acted with the knowledge that tendering exculpating legal 
opinions to the Bush administration would result in it carrying out stated policy 
imperatives to torture Zubaydah and others, and proceeded with the purpose that 
those imperatives be carried out and succeed.  The OLC attorneys carefully 
constructed legal opinions patently planned to thwart prospective prosecutions for 
the illegal torture of Zubaydah and others, enabling the Bush administration to act 
with the assurance that their opinions would serve that very purpose.  
Knowledge that one’s conduct will enable the commission of a crime is a 
sufficient predicate to liability as an accomplice.68  Academic debate, provoked by 
a possible distinction between acting with the purpose to help a crime succeed, and 
knowledge that one has provided an instrumentality necessary to carry it out, has 
no constructive role to play in this analysis.  The conduct of the attorneys of the 
OLC might satisfy either standard.   
On trial for the crime of torture, therefore, the attorneys of the OLC likely 
would be tempted to base their defense not on the absence of knowledge of or the 
purpose to enable the prospective torture of Zubaydah and others, but rather on the 
honesty of their judgment about the matters asserted.  After all, it is said, an 
attorney renders only the best judgment she can about the law, and she cannot be 
responsible for the consequences of that judgment once put in the hands of a 
client.69  Ironically, however, the fact that cognizance of illegality is not an element 
of the crime of torture might trouble the former attorneys of the OLC far more than 
it would trouble former President Bush.70  
                                                                                                     
Note, supra note 41, at 825 n.100 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)).  
See also United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 742 (11th Cir. 1989) (“To prove aiding and abetting, the 
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) associated himself with the 
crime, (2) intended to bring it about, and (3) sought by his actions to make it succeed.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940).  In Backun, the court noted 
that: 
Guilt as an accessory depends, not on “having a stake” in the outcome of crime . . . but 
on aiding and assisting the perpetrators. . . . One who sells a gun to another knowing 
that he is buying it to commit a murder, would hardly escape conviction as an accessory 
to the murder by showing that he had received full price for the gun. 
Id. at 637.  See also United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that “aiding 
and abetting murder is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the supplier of the murder 
weapon knew the purpose for which it would be used.”). 
 69. See, e.g., In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1, 29 (1903) (holding that “In the ordinary case of advice to 
clients, if an attorney acts in good faith and in honest belief that his advise is well-founded and in the 
just interests of his client, he cannot be held liable for error in judgment.”). 
 70. The conviction of the OLC attorneys would turn initially on whether acts actually criminal were 
committed upon their advice.  See Kelly, 888 F.2d at 742 n.17.  That is not to say, however, that it would 
be in any way relevant to the liability of the attorney-advisors whether President Bush and his delegates 
are charged with any offense.  See, e.g., United States v. Hodge, 211 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2000).  The court 
in Hodge noted that: 
[I]t is beyond dispute that a person charged with aiding and abetting a crime can be 
convicted regardless of the fate of the principal.  [18 U.S.C. § 2] clearly states that: 
“[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.” . . .  We 
have also held . . . that: “18 U.S.C. § 2, the majority of cases, and the Model Penal 
Code, all take the view that an aider and abettor should be treated like any other 
principal, and be required to ‘stand on his own two feet.’”   
2010] CRIMES OF CONVICTION 179 
The old maxim, “ignorance of the law is no excuse” might apply with 
particular force to evaluate potential charges against the attorneys of the OLC, for a 
defense based on a mistake of law would be no defense at all.71  Any claimed 
subjective belief by the attorneys of the OLC that the torture of Zubaydah would 
not be a crime would be as completely irrelevant to their defense as the claimed 
belief by Cintolo that witness tampering was privileged and thus beyond the reach 
of the law.  
The OLC opinions were tendered to facilitate the infliction of waterboarding 
on Zubaydah and others.  The OLC tendered those opinions with the full 
knowledge that waterboarding would ensue as a result, and that it might not ensue 
otherwise.  The OLC planned the torture Zubaydah and others, and prescribed the 
particulars of that torture in minute detail.  The OLC instructed the CIA in the 
minutia of the techniques of torture to be applied. Unlike those who relied on their 
advice, a mistake of law in these circumstances would be no excuse for the 
attorneys who made it. 
The fact that Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo, in particular, 
countenanced, planned, enabled, and prescribed the means of torture because it was 
desired by the Executive that he do so is perhaps explicable, but irrelevant.  He 
likely was plucked from academia to work for the OLC owing to his broad views 
                                                                                                     
Id. at 77.  See also Ex parte Thompson, 179 S.W.3d 549, 553 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing State v. 
Kaplan, 469 A.2d 1354, 1355 (N.H. 1983) (conviction of wife who pleaded guilty to accomplice role in 
murder of husband would not be reversed even though principal, an alleged contract killer, was 
acquitted, and noting that “conviction of an accomplice is thus premised upon proof of the commission 
of the criminal act, rather than on the guilt of the principal”) (citation omitted); Jeter v. State, 274 A.2d 
337, 338-39 (Md. 1971) (collecting cases and concluding that virtually all American jurisdictions hold 
that the subsequent acquittal of a principal does not affect the trial or conviction of an accomplice)). 
Id.  In Ex parte Thompson, the court noted the long-standing and current understanding that liability as 
an aider and abettor attaches in the absence of conviction of a principal, as follows:  
The North Carolina Supreme Court has traced this principle back three hundred years to 
Wallis’ Case, 1 Salk. 334. See State v. Whitt, 18 S.E. 715, 716 (N.C. 1993). The Model 
Penal Code also adopts this position. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(7) (2001) 
(accomplice can be convicted “though the person claimed to have committed the 
offense . . .  has been acquitted.”). 
 Id. 
 71. Most torture statutes require an intent to cause pain and suffering for some defined purpose, 
such as the coerced disclosure of information.  The prosecution of such offenses in such instances thus 
requires an intent to act, with an intent to cause a specified harm, for a specified reason.  The OLC’s 
opinions notwithstanding, here all of those elements could be easily satisfied on the basis of the Bybee 
Memoranda, read together with later OLC memoranda that establish the CIA took action in accordance 
with the OLC’s prescriptions (see, e.g,. supra, note 17).  See, e.g., United States v. Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 60 
(1st Cir. 1978) (“[I]n order to convict the aider or abettor [must have] kn[own] that the principal was 
committing the acts which constituted the elements of the crime.  That does not mean, of course, that 
either the principal or aider and abettor must [have] know[n] . . . that those acts were illegal.”)  The 
exculpatory hypothesis in the Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum that the CIA interrogators would not 
“specifically intend” to cause “severe” harm to the detainees upon the sustained application of 
waterboarding was patently specious: the acts undertaken neatly fit the nearly universal definition of 
torture. The “specific intent” of the relevant actors to cause “severe” harm as a result of waterboarding 
and other enhanced interrogation techniques carried out according to the prescriptions of the OLC can 
be inferred on the basis of the evidence already in the public record, notwithstanding OLC word 
processing that suggested such intent could be plausibly denied.  Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum, supra 
note 10, at 8. 
180 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
about presidential authority.72 Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo 
understandably may have believed that his work at the OLC was akin to his other 
work, such as writing theoretical essays about executive power.  His conduct was 
not therefore excusable.   
If prosecuted, the criminal culpability of the attorneys of the OLC as 
accessories to the torture enterprise undertaken by the United States after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 will depend solely on the nature of the acts they 
helped to happen, not any good faith belief those acts were correctly and 
permissibly done. As stated colorfully by the court in Cintolo:  
Having called the tune, Cintolo cannot be excused from paying the piper on the 
basis of his vocation. . . . [W]e emphatically reject the notion that a law degree, 
like some sorcerer’s amulet, can ward off the rigors of the criminal law. No spells 
of this sort are cast by the acceptance of a defendant’s retainer.73 
IV.  THE CRIME OF CONVICTION OF JOHN CHOON YOO 
President Obama has ordered the launch of Hellfire missiles into the homes of 
persons who are not members of any recognized army, located within the 
boundaries of nations with which the United States is not at war, killing persons not 
known to have committed any crime.74  He has ordered the execution on the high 
                                                                                                     
 72. “John Yoo, in particular, expressed his extreme views about unitary executive power before 
joining the government.”  Rosen, supra note 25.  See also Carrie Johnson, Amid Scrutiny, Yoo Pushes 
Back, WASH. POST, July 27, 2009, at A3. The Washington Post reported: 
Professor Yoo’s notions of Presidential authority [were] born early in his legal career, 
before stints as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Judge 
Laurence H. Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  Those 
positions, which even friends call extreme, endeared him to a Bush White House 
seeking to adopt a centralized approach to power.   
Id. 
 73. Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 995-96. 
 74. Since taking office, Barack Obama has authorized the repeated use of unmanned drones in 
Central Asia, causing numerous deaths and injuries. See Bernd Debusmann, Killer Robots and a 
Revolution in Warfare, REUTERS, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
articlePrint?articleId=USLM674603;  Greg Miller, Drones based in Pakistan; Feinstein’s Disclosure 
Makes Things Awkward For Islamabad, Which Has Protested the U.S. Campaign of Airstrikes from the 
Planes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A3. The L.A. Times reported:  
A senior U.S. lawmaker said Thursday that unmanned CIA Predator aircraft operating 
in Pakistan are flown from an air base inside that country, a revelation likely to 
embarrass the Pakistani government and complicate its counter-terrorism collaboration 
with the United States. The attacks are extremely unpopular in Pakistan, in part because 
of the high number of civilian casualties inflicted in dozens of strikes. The use of 
Predators armed with Hellfire antitank missiles has emerged as perhaps the most 
important tool of the U.S. in its effort to attack Al Qaeda in its sanctuaries along the 
Pakistani-Afghan border.  
Id.  See also Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Drone War: Are Predators Our Best Weapon or 
Worst Enemy? NEW REPUBLIC, June 3, 2009, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/the-drone-war. 
The New Republic reported that the drone program escalated dramatically under the incoming 
administration of President Barack Obama, killing hundreds of persons, including civilians: 
The drone war against Al Qaeda’s leaders—and, increasingly, their Pakistani-based 
Taliban allies—has been waged with little public discussion or congressional 
investigation of its legality or efficacy, even though the offensive is essentially a 
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seas of persons engaged in piracy.75  The President of the United States has no 
inherent authority to order the execution of anyone.  Absent justification, using the 
forces of the United States to end the lives of persons abroad is unlawful.76  
The crime of torture of persons detained without trial by the United States is 
analogous.  Reasonable minds can differ about the ultimate criminal responsibility 
of those who designed, ordered, encouraged, or engaged in the otherwise illegal 
torture of Al Qaeda detainees after the events of September 11, 2001, because the 
defenses of self-defense, defense of others, and necessity might apply.  Those 
affirmative defenses concede the prima facie elements of a crime, but assert in 
response an exculpatory justification.77  It can be stated reliably that the OLC 
                                                                                                     
program of assassination that kills not only militant leaders, but also civilians in a 
country that is, at least nominally, a close ally of the United States.  . . . President 
Obama has not only continued the drone program, he has ratcheted it up further. In 
2007, there were three drone strikes in Pakistan; in 2008, there were 34  . . . Just three 
days into his presidency, Obama authorized a near-simultaneous pair of drone strikes 
against targets in North and South Waziristan. Since he took office, there have been a 
total of 16 airstrikes, or roughly one per week. Our analysis shows that these attacks 
have killed some 170 people, but only one has killed an important Al Qaeda or Taliban 
leader, presumably because many of them have decamped from the tribal areas. 
Id. 
 75. See Mark Hosenball & Michael Isikoff, Blood in the Water: Will Deadly Force Deter Somali 
Pirates—Or Just Make Them More Violent?, Newsweek, Apr. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/194167?tid=relatedcl:  
While it has been almost universally praised stateside, President Obama’s directive 
authorizing snipers to kill Somali pirates is getting criticized from one quarter: the 
international shipping and insurance industries, which fear the commando action will 
only spur pirates to greater violence and put merchant ships at greater risk. . . .  Obama  
. . .authorized a team of Navy SEAL commandos to shoot three Somali pirates who had 
been holding Richard Phillips, captain of  . . .  [a] cargo ship, hostage for five days.  
Id. 
 76. Paul Richter, White House Justifies Option of Lethal Force, L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1998, at 1.  The 
L.A. Times reported:  
The Clinton administration believes that it has a legal right to use deadly force against 
terrorist leaders such as Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden, despite a 23-year-old 
presidential ban on assassinations, officials say.  In public, administration officials 
remain studiously ambiguous on this sensitive issue. . . . [T]he administration appears to 
have fairly wide latitude to strike back at terrorists.  Specifically, it can authorize 
military commandos or undercover agents to use deadly force against the leadership of 
an organization that has hurt or threatened Americans, U.S. officials say.  That 
prerogative arises from a fundamental right of national self-defense, they say.  As 
supporting evidence, they cite language in the United Nations charter endorsing every 
nation’s right to defend itself from attack.  “At all times, we may act in self-defense,” 
one senior U.S. official said.  “That’s what we did in August.”  “Lawful use of force in 
self-defense,” another official said, “is not assassination.”  
Id. 
 77. There are fine and fluctuating historic distinctions between legal excuse and justification.  A 
comprehensive work on the subject finds overarching societal aims most often associated with the latter 
and personal circumstances with the former, though this distinction does not hold up consistently in case 
law.   See Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What 
They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725 (2004).  The Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum used the 
term “justification” in connection with the considered defenses of necessity and self-defense, as follows: 
“We conclude that, under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation 
methods that might violate Section 2340A.”  Id. at 2. 
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plausibly described possible justifications for the torture of detained enemy 
combatants in the very difficult circumstances following the attacks of September 
11, 2001.78  
To conclude that a competent attorney could have omitted such advice under 
the same or similar circumstances therefore would appear unwarranted.  The 
opinions by the OLC that torture someday might be found justified by a court or 
jury were no more or less than guidance to the president and his delegates that they 
took a chance—a chance that prosecutions might ensue and culminate in criminal 
convictions should they carry out the contemplated torture enterprise.  Opining that 
the result in any such prosecution might be acquittal cannot be deemed a criminal 
act. 
Had the OLC limited its opinions to the possibility that defenses of 
justification might apply, however, then the torture enterprise might not have 
proceeded.  It can be readily demonstrated that CIA interrogators would have been 
unsatisfied with the cold comfort that one day their decisions to engage in 
enhanced interrogation techniques known to implicate the laws proscribing torture 
might be vindicated in a trial by a judicial authority.79  The same might be said of 
former President Bush’s decision to green light their activities.  Those actors 
needed something more. 
And the OLC obliged.  By advising that the president had absolute authority to 
issue orders to conduct enhanced interrogations, and by cloaking those who carried 
out that torture with the confidence afforded by a blanket authorization to so act 
without fear of punishment, the OLC created the climate of pretext that 
accompanies the ultimate in anticipatory exculpation — the claim to sovereign 
immunity.  The claim that “rex non potest peccare” is the ultimate carte blanche.80 
                                                                                                     
 78. The viability of these defenses is beyond the scope of this article, but would necessarily entail a 
thorough examination of possibly less onerous alternatives.  See, e.g., Whitney Kaufman, Torture and 
The “Distributive Justice” Theory of Self-Defense: An Assessment, 22 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 93 
(2008) (providing a contrary view concerning the availability of self-defense or others in instances of 
torture).  Specifically, Professor Kaufman invites readers to: 
[c]onsider, for instance, the moral philosopher Thomas Nagel’s classic discussion of the 
man whose friends are badly injured in a car wreck and who gets himself to a nearby 
isolated house.  Once there he is tempted to twist a child’s arm to cause sufficient pain 
(that is, torture the child) to get the mother to give him her car keys to help his friends.  
Nagel concludes that this would not be permissible, for it is an example of violating the 
child’s right not to be used as a means, however morally significant the goal (saving 
innocent lives).  That torture is not defensive but instrumental force can also be seen in 
that it is in practice irrelevant who one tortures so long as one achieves one’s goal; for 
example, one could try to get the terrorist to reveal the information by torturing his wife 
or child in front of him. 
Id. at 110.  
 79. On May 10, 2009, former Vice President Cheney predicted that prosecution of former agents of 
the United States involved in the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” would chill such use in the 
future owing to low “risk tolerance” associated with potential criminal or civil liability.  Face the 
Nation, supra note 18; see also supra note 27. 
 80. “The King can do no wrong” is the ultimate “blank check.”  The doctrine was rejected at the 
founding of the United States.  See, e.g., Clinton, 520 U.S. 681, wherein the Court noted: 
[The president’s] argument does not place any reliance on the English ancestry that 
informs our common-law jurisprudence; he does not claim the prerogatives of the 
monarchs who asserted that “[t]he King can do no wrong.”  See 1 W. Blackstone, 
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By so opining, the OLC rendered other aspects of its Torture Memoranda 
superfluous.  
Uncannily, the OLC accomplished exactly what it intended.  It is precisely 
reliance upon advice by the OLC that has been identified as a determinative excuse 
to preclude prosecution of the actors who engaged in otherwise illegal torture.81  
The policy makers needed a talisman to ward off the need to prove justification, 
and, they got just what they wanted in the OLC’s opinions.  To date, the opinions 
of the OLC have worked just like the charm they were intended to be.  
If one proceeds from the premise that President Obama’s decision not to 
prosecute those relying on the OLC’s advice is not obviously incorrect as a matter 
of law (if not public policy), then it is all the more important that the merits of the 
OLC’s advice be tested in court.  The OLC opined not that the president would act 
outside the law, but that the president could so act without regard to the law.   The 
merits of the exculpatory claim that the war powers afforded by the Constitution 
preclude prosecution of the president and his delegates for acts defined as criminal 
by Congress deserve to be the subject of as definitive an adjudication as possible in 
the crucible of a criminal trial.   
To obtain that adjudication necessarily will require prosecution of those who 
attempted to provide exculpation for actions they abetted.  The OLC manifestly 
intended to cloak executive action with an immunity from prosecution, and by so 
doing, gave the Bush administration assurances that coordination with the other 
branches of the federal government was unnecessary to the putative exercise by the 
president of war powers.  In this, the OLC assumed the role of principal with 
respect to taking action upon its prescriptions.   
Any person who carries into practice a belief that the supreme power of the 
president is a defense to prosecution for the crime of torture deserves his day(s) in 
court.  There, untested academic theories about the power of the president of the 
United States in times of war to act with impunity can be fully and finally 
vindicated, or determinatively discredited. 
The true crime of conviction of Professor Yoo—and there is no doubt he is so 
convinced—is the use to which he put his theoretical views about the illegitimacy 
of any legislative or judicial check on presidential war powers (save the power of 
the purse).  Even while he served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the 
                                                                                                     
Commentaries . . . Although we have adopted the related doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, the common-law fiction that “[t]he king . . . is not only incapable of doing 
wrong, but even of thinking wrong,” ibid., was rejected at the birth of the Republic.  
Id. at 697 n.24. 
 81. See supra notes 23 and 31.  By declining prosecution of those who followed his advice, 
President Obama and Attorney General Holder, ex post, have afforded Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Yoo’s opinions the full force of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the 
United States.  Many believe Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo basically rewrote the U.S. Code 
on torture, redefining both its scope and intent, and then instructed actors to commit torture in particular 
ways asserted by him to be consistent with his version of the law.  By limiting prosecution of patently 
proscribed acts to only those which “exceeded” Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo’s specifications 
and instructions, the Obama administration today thereby validates that strategy.   If left unchallenged, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo will have been able not only to redefine an offense proscribed 
by Congress, but also prospectively thwart judicial review by seemingly deliberate manipulation of 
prosecutorial abstention. 
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OLC, John Choon Yoo published scholarship that established him as a key 
proponent of a broad theory of presidential power under the Constitution of the 
United States to unilaterally initiate and conduct war, with all of the powers 
necessary and ancillary thereto.82  During his tenure at the OLC, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Yoo’s opinion that statutes proscribing torture could not be 
constitutionally applied to the president while exercising war powers was a mere 
extension of those views—extreme views that demonstrably infected the OLC.83 
                                                                                                     
 82. See John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002).  Professor 
Yoo: 
In light of Article IIs text, I have argued that the Constitution constructs a loose 
framework within which the President as commander-in-chief enjoys substantial 
discretion and initiative in conducting military hostilities. . . . The centralization of 
authority in the President is particularly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and 
foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, 
and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other 
branch. . . . This point applies perhaps most directly in war than in any other context. . . 
. There is no doubt that the Constitution provides Congress with a powerful check on 
warmaking, but it comes through the authority to grant or deny funds to wage war.  
Id. at 1676-77, 1681.  
 83. Cataloguing the volume of persuasive authority that has found Professor Yoo’s notions of 
presidential war powers outside of the mainstream is beyond the scope of this article.  See generally 
Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret 
Renditions, Domestic Spying and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 382-
85, nn.97-99 (collecting authority).  As Professor Owen Fiss of Yale University recently explained, the 
Bush administration OLC reproduced in its zeal precisely what went wrong during the administration of 
President Richard M. Nixon, who was impeached by the House of Representatives and thereafter 
resigned the presidency owing to abuses of power:  
Not only did the [OLC] seek to narrow the scope of the rule against torture by 
manipulating the definition of the practices covered, it also denied that the President is 
bound, as a matter of law, by the prohibition against torture, and in doing so harked 
back to a conception of presidential power long identified with the Nixon White House.  
In the late 1970s, President Richard Nixon, in an effort to defend the action that led to 
his impeachment and eventual resignation, publicly maintained that the President is 
entitled to disobey the law whenever he determines it is for the good of the nation.  If 
the President does an act, he said, it is not illegal.  History judged this view harshly, but 
it was taken as an article of faith in certain circles, which included Vice President Dick 
Cheney, and it became an organizing theme of the Bush presidency, most remarkably, 
even in the debates over torture. 
Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 1, 6  (2009), available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/content/view/764/14/.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States 
seemed, in principle at least, to undermine Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Professor Yoo’s 
views of unaccountable presidential war power in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  In that 
case, Justice O’Connor, announced the judgment of the court, and joined by the Chief Justice, Justice 
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, stated: “Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”  Id. at 536.  
Although writing in dissent from the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas seemingly agreed that “[even] 
in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave 
public danger[, action by the president can] be set aside by the courts [if] in conflict with the 
Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.” Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted; 
emphasis added).  The issue framed by Justice Thomas, for whom Professor Yoo served, may be more 
precisely stated in this instance to be the proper role of the Supreme Court to determine not only 
whether laws proscribing torture were constitutionally enacted, but also whether those laws may be 
constitutionally applied over a claim by the President of the United States (or his delegates) to the free 
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In this context, Professor Yoo’s theories about the war making powers of the 
President of the United States are held out as a sui generis construction of the grant 
of executive authority to a president by Article II of the United States 
Constitution.84  In fact, in this context, the theory that the war powers acquired by 
the President of the United States under the Constitution are nearly absolute 
(subject only to often necessarily ex post check by means of the appropriation 
powers of Congress) mirrors in eerily and nearly verbatim terms an old and long-
ago discredited theory of governance: the Fuehrer principle.85  
A modern court might find little precedent to help it to discover the merits of a 
wartime Fuehrer principle advocated by the advisors to a present-day President of 
the United States.  But the court would not be without compelling guidance in 
American jurisprudence.  
Following the surrender of the German forces in 1945, in the third of twelve 
cases brought by the United States before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 
charges were heard against sixteen former German attorneys and jurists for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity alleged to have been committed during World 
War II.86  Declarations by tribunals condemning them condemned the Fuehrer 
                                                                                                     
exercise of war powers.  Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo posited no such role for the courts. 
However, as Justice Stevens explained the rudimentary elements of the governance of the United States 
in Clinton v. Jones:  
[W]e have long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the 
authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. . . . [This] principle [was] 
established in Marbury v. Madison [where we stated] that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”  
Id. at 703 (internal citations omitted).   
 84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States”).   
 85. In about 1920, the National Socialist German Workers’ (“National Socialist”) Party formed in 
Munich, Germany.  Within months, Adolf Hitler became its Führer. (The term “Fuehrer” is roughly 
translated as “Leader”).  The National Socialists adopted a theory of governance known as the 
“Führerprinzip” or “Leader principle.”  In 1933, Hitler became chancellor of Germany.  On August 2, 
1934, he was designated “Führer und Reichskanzler” or “Leader and Chancellor of the (Third) Reich.”  
See generally WILLIAM J. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH (1960) (In a conflict known 
as “World War II,” Germany and its allies fought against and were ultimately defeated by a coalition of 
armed forces, including those of the United States, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics). 
 86. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, available at 
http://www.mazal.org/NMT-Home.htm. The Mazal Library describes those military tribunals generally 
as follows: 
The Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT) differ[ed] 
from the [more well-known] Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) in a number of different ways.  The IMT process held between 
November 14, 1945 and October 1, 1946 was held under the aegis of an international 
court with judges and prosecutors from the United States, Great Britain, the Provisional 
Government of France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. . . . [T]he IMT 
prosecuted those major war criminals who were the leaders of the [defeated government 
of wartime Germany.] . . . The NMT process held from October 1946 through May of 
1949 focused on many of the actual perpetrators of the war crimes.  The judges and 
prosecutors of these war criminals were exclusively American.  
Id.  One of the cases brought before the NMT was United States v. Altstoetter, which is commonly 
known as the “Justice Case.”  3 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuermberg Military Tribunal (1951) 
[hereinafter Altstoetter].   In that case, “[o]f the sixteen defendants indicted, nine were officials in the 
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principle in no uncertain terms.  
In this passage from the judgment by the Nuremburg Military Tribunal 
pronouncing the guilt of several former members of the wartime German Ministry 
of Justice, the relevance of the Fuehrer principle to their guilt was explained: 
We pass now  . . . to a consideration of the law in action, and of the influence of 
the “Fuehrer principle” as it affected the officials of the Ministry of Justice . . . . 
Two basic principles controlled conduct within the Ministry of Justice.  The first 
concerned the absolute power of Hitler in person or by delegated authority to 
enact, enforce, and adjudicate law. . . .  Concerning this first principle, [it was] 
said:  
  “[O]ne will have to say that restrictions under German law did not exist for 
Hitler.  He was legibus solutus in the same meaning in which Louis XIV claimed 
that for himself in France . . . .”87 
The Fuehrer principle was more than just another academic theory to be 
bandied about by persons without responsibility for the real-world consequences of 
the opinions they expressed.  The Fuehrer principle was advanced to support a very 
specific agenda—to foster and promote the legal authority of the executive in 
Germany to achieve “victory” during a time of war.  
All powers to do as the Fuehrer saw fit to achieve that “victory” were deemed 
to be implied by role his as “Commander-in-Chief”: 
[T]he Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by him which serve to further or 
achieve victory. Therefore—without being bound by existing legal regulations—in 
his capacity as leader of the nation [and] Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces . . . the Fuehrer must be in a position to [use] force with all means at his 
disposal . . . to fulfill his duties.88  
In comparison, consider this passage from the Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum: 
The President’s constitutional power to protect the security of the United States 
and the lives and safety of its people must be understood . . .  [to] imply the 
ancillary powers necessary to their successful exercise. . . .  In wartime, it is for the 
President alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy. 
  Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants 
would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority 
in the President. . . .  Congress can no[t] . . . interfere with the President’s conduct 
of the interrogation of enemy combatants. . . . [L]aws that seek to prevent the 
President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks 
upon the United States [are unconstitutional].89 
In other words, just as National Socialists assigned to their commander-in-
chief broad and unchecked war powers, the OLC assigned to the President of the 
United States unchecked powers to achieve victory against the amorphous forces 
with which the United States was “at war.”  The OLC expressly disclaimed the 
                                                                                                     
[wartime Germany] Ministry of Justice. [Among those,] . . . defendants Schlegelberger . . . and Klemm 
[discussed infra] each had held the position of Under Secretary “Staatssekretaer”, (also translated as 
State Secretary) in the . . . Ministry of Justice.  Id. 
 87. Id. at 1010-1011. 
 88. Id. at 1012. 
 89. See Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 10, at 36-39. 
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power of mere “laws” to “prevent” the president from doing anything he 
“believe[d] necessary” to “gain intelligence.” There is no distinction that makes a 
difference here. 
The OLC went even further, along precisely the same line of logical reasoning 
employed by the National Socialists. Respected National Socialist German legal 
authorities opined that not only the Fuehrer, but all those who acted on his 
authority, were shielded from legal accountability by reason of the express and 
implied powers inherent in his role as the Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces:  
The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, presented by the defendants 
themselves is clear:  In German legal theory, Hitler’s law was a shield to those 
who acted under it. 90 
Now, consider this passage from the Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum: 
[B]oth courts and prosecutors should reject prosecutions that apply federal 
criminal laws to activity that is authorized pursuant to . . . the President’s 
constitutional powers [as commander-in-chief].91 
In other words, just as accepted German legal theory postulated that Hitler’s 
orders shielded all those who obeyed them, so too the OLC concluded that the 
Constitution of the United States forbids prosecution not only of the president, but 
also any person acting under his “shield” in a time of war—even if acting in direct 
violation of the laws of the United States prohibiting torture. 
There may be some who will support the notion that the president may 
exercise unchecked power, as a Caesar or Fuehrer, with respect to the conduct of 
war, until Congress disbands or defunds the armed forces of the United States to 
halt it (after the damage is done and without consequence for those who violated 
positive law).  In an age of war without end, however, others will insist that this 
creed must be condemned, just as it was condemned in post-war Germany—not 
only because it is morally wrong, but because it threatens the very foundation of 
the constitutional republic of the United States. Until and unless rebuked by a 
judicial authority, criminal acts taken upon a perceived principle of unchecked 
presidential power may remain the subject of intense criticism, but such criticism 
will dissolve into meaningless, idle chatter in the teeth of another crisis.  
Again, historical precedent cannot be ignored. In wartime Germany, similar 
subversions of the German Republic by the forces of the National Socialist jurists 
and attorneys were allowed to flourish.  Respected German legal scholars 
advocated the Fuehrer principle, and then assumed senior positions in the 
government.  Perhaps none of them is more representative, at the highest levels of 
the Reich’s Ministry of Justice, than Louis Rudolph Franz Schlegelberger.  His is a 
cautionary tale. 
Schlegelberger received his law degree from the University of Leipzig in 1899 
and passed the state law examination in 1901.  He was the author of several law 
books. In 1927, Schlegelberger was appointed Ministerial Director in the Reich 
Ministry of Justice.  He quickly rose through the ranks in the Ministry. In 1941, 
                                                                                                     
 90. Altstoetter, supra note 86, at 1011. 
 91. Bybee-Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 10, at 36. 
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Schlegelberger was put in charge of the Reich Ministry of Justice as Administrative 
Secretary of State. He resigned from the Ministry of Justice in 1942.92 
Schlegelberger was the highest ranking defendant in the Justice Cases.  He was 
charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.93  The Fuehrer principle 
played a prominent role in the actions that led to Schlegelberger’s conviction.  The 
Tribunal found that he “supported the pretension of Hitler in his assumption of 
power to deal with life and death in disregard of even the pretense of judicial 
process.  By his exhortations and directives, Schlegelberger contributed to the 
destruction of judicial independence.”94  In addition, the Tribunal condemned “[the 
acquiescent] attitude toward atrocities committed by the police [that could] be 
inferred from his conduct.”95 
Schlegelberger presented an interesting defense, which was also claimed by 
most of the other defendants in the Justice Cases.  He claimed that the 
administration of justice in wartime Germany was under persistent assault by 
advocates of a German police state, and that, absent his efforts, matters would have 
been even worse.  The evidence showed instead that Schlegelberger and the other 
defendants who joined in his claim of justification facilitated the dirty work that the 
leaders of the German State demanded, in order to maintain the Ministry of Justice 
                                                                                                     
 92. Alstoetter, supra note 86, at 1081-82. 
 93. Control Council Law No. 10 (“CC 10”) dealt with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
first penal provision of CC 10, at Article II, defined war crimes as follows:  
Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or 
customs of war, including but not limited to, … murder or ill treatment of prisoners of 
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity. 
Id. at XIX.  CC 10, Article II defined crimes against humanity, as follows: “inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war.”  Id.  CC 10 defined as criminal acts 
“atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to . . . imprisonment, torture, rape, or other acts 
committed against any civilian population . . . whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the 
country where perpetrated.”  Id. 
 94. Alstoetter, supra note 86, at 1083. 
 95. Id. at 1085.  The subject of enhanced interrogations was at issue also in the trial by the NMT of 
another attorney,  Herbert Klemm.  The evidence showed that as a Chief Prosecutor in the Ministry of 
Justice, Klemm was responsible for the review of “criminal procedures concerning more severe 
interrogations.”  Id. at 1088.  The Tribunal noted that, at least upon first impression, “severe 
interrogations” of persons were of interest to the Ministry of Justice: “The practice of more severe 
interrogations . . . caused much worry to those concerned with the administration of ,justice.  [T]he term 
‘more severe interrogations’ . . . meant [the] ‘third degree’ methods which Hitler authorized the police 
to use in cases considered important for the safety of the State.”  Id. at 1088.  After these interrogations 
were transferred to the Gestapo, however, and put “beyond the jurisdiction of law” the interest of the 
Ministry waned. As explained by the NMT, in its judgment convicting Klemm:  
Certainly it can hardly be assumed that the defendant Klemm was unaware of the 
practice of the Gestapo with regard to obtaining confessions. He had dealt with this 
matter during his early period with the department of justice. It is hardly credible that he 
believed that the police methods which at an earlier time were subject to some scrutiny 
by the Ministry of Justice, had become less harsh because the Gestapo, in October of 
1940, was placed beyond the jurisdiction of law. He must have been aware that a 
prolific source of clear cases based on confessions and, therefore, legally incontestable, 
came to him from the obscurity of the torture chamber.  
Id. at 1093. 
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in the good graces of Hitler.  They employed the Ministry of Justice as a means to 
accomplish Hitler’s wrongful ends, under the guise of law.  
Pronouncing Schlegelberger guilty as charged and sentencing him to life 
imprisonment, the American authority discredited the Fuehrer principle in a 
manner only possible by persons who came from a country that would never permit 
it to flourish.96  The Tribunal stated that “[t]he prostitution of a judicial system for 
the accomplishment of criminal ends involves an element of evil to the State which 
is not found in frank atrocities which do not sully judicial robes.”97 
Professor Yoo’s views may be likewise condemned on moral grounds by those 
who believe that the Constitution of the United States does not contemplate a 
chamber of horror used to torture perceived enemies who threaten the homeland, 
operated by the White House in violation of the United States Code.  But, should 
advice that so closely mirrored the Fuehrer principle, no matter how repugnant, be 
the basis for criminal responsibility for acts undertaken in reliance upon that 
advice?  
Having postulated Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo’s true crime of 
conviction, we must return to the issue of the accountability of the attorneys of the 
OLC.  The question remains whether an attorney in modern-day America may, 
with impunity, put into practice an abhorrent theory of dictatorial power to justify 
the wanton violation of criminal laws by the President of the United States and his 
delegates.  
The answers are yes and no. Again, on trial as an accessory to the crime of 
torture, the former attorneys of the OLC might be able to mount a decent defense 
that their advice concerning available affirmative defenses was a valid exercise of 
professional judgment—which left the choice to the executive whether to proceed 
with the contemplated torture enterprise. But their advice that former President 
Bush had unilateral authority in times of war to violate the laws of the United 
States with impunity merits trial of the entire matter.98  If the opinions by the OLC 
                                                                                                     
 96. Indeed, Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, who presided over the 
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (see supra note 86) later, 
and many believe brilliantly, summed up the scope of the constitutional check on the powers of the 
President of the United States in his oft-cited concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), as follows:  
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. 
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only be disabling the 
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the 
equilibrium established by our constitutional system. 
Id. at 637-38.  
 97. Alstoetter, supra note 86, at 1086. 
 98. In addition to opining that the Fuehrer principle permitted the President of the United States to 
violate the laws of the United States with impunity, “John Yoo [also] argued that constitutional 
provisions ensuring free speech and barring warrantless searches could be disregarded by the president 
in wartime.” R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, Post-9/11 Memos Show More Bush-Era Legal Errors, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at A5.  If the former attorneys of the OLC are heard to say rightly that the 
Congress cannot constitutionally bar a torture enterprise undertaken by the president against perceived 
enemies of the Republic, then their defense will be successful and the law found wanting. Acquittal 
190 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
in this latter respect are found to have been the sine qua non—that without which 
the Bush administration’s torture enterprise would not have ensued—then the issue 
will be properly framed.  
The former attorneys of the OLC could not be heard to credibly say in their 
defense that they had no control over the actions of the executive branch, or no 
expectation that their opinions would lead to torture.  Once again, any such claim 
would echo the futile pleas of those members of the National Socialists’ Ministry 
of Justice, who, when faced with trial for their actions, claimed that they did not 
know what would happen to persons as a result of their legal opinions condoning, 
facilitating, and planning the brutality done by others.  The Ministers’ plea of 
ignorance was summarily rejected by the Tribunal as follows: 
The defendants contend that they were unaware of the atrocities committed by the 
Gestapo and in concentration camps. This contention is subject to serious question. 
Dr. Behl testified that he considered it impossible that anyone, particularly in 
Berlin, should have been ignorant of the brutalities of the SS and the Gestapo. He 
said: “In Berlin it would have been hardly possible for anybody not to know about 
it, and certainly not for anybody who was a lawyer and who dealt with the 
administration of justice.” He testified specifically that he could not imagine that 
any person in the Ministry of Justice  . . . or as a practicing attorney . . . could be in 
ignorance of the facts of common knowledge concerning the treatment of 
prisoners in concentration camps. . . . In short, the claim that . . . they were 
ignorant [is not credible]. 99 
Without any doubt, the OLC knew the use to which its advice would be put.  
The OLC prescribed the terms of torture, in precise and detailed terms.  Its detailed 
instructions to the CIA interrogators included the specific admonitions to be 
furnished to Zubaydah while tormenting him.100  
                                                                                                     
therefore would establish an awesome power of the President not only to capture and torture persons 
seized overseas—charged with no offense, but believed by the president alone of possessing information 
that might help thwart an attack on the United States—but also might strongly suggest the validity of 
their ancillary conclusions that the President of the United States holds inherent, unitary, and 
discretionary war power to violate of the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
with impunity. 
 99. Altstoetter, supra note 86, at 1079. 
 100. With the exception of a lofty academic treatment of issues marginally requiring an exegesis of 
United States constitutional law, the Bybee Memoranda were appallingly amateurish — the author’s 
lack of objectivity, proficiency, and actual experience in the practice of law glaringly evident.  In truly 
one of the more bizarre passages of Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, the OLC explained how to “legally” 
torment Zubaydah with a caterpillar:  
In addition to using the confinement boxes alone, you also would like to introduce an 
insect into one of the boxes with Zubaydah.  As we understand it, you plan to inform 
Zubaydah that you are going to place a stinging insect into the box, but you will actually 
place a harmless insect in the box, such as a caterpillar.  If you do so, to ensure that you 
are outside the predicate act requirement, you must inform him that the insects will not 
have a sting that would produce death or severe pain.  If, however, you were to place the 
insect in the box without informing him that you are doing so, then, in order to not 
commit a predicate act, you should not affirmatively lead him to believe that any insect 
is present which has a sting that could produce severe pain or suffering or even cause 
his death.  
Bybee-Rizzo Memorandum, supra note 5, at 14.  This inept attempt to legislate the criminality of 
torment, by the words spoken or not spoken while conducting it, appears to reflect not only a complete 
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The OLC conceived a legal framework that would exculpate those directly 
responsible for the torture of enemy combatants detained by the United States.  It 
blessed the entire enterprise in an overt attempt to provide immunity from 
prosecution to the participants.  A finder of fact could conclude reasonably that had 
the OLC said no torture is legal, the result would have been no illegal torture.  
The activities by the attorneys in the OLC in connection with the torture 
enterprise described above, and particularly the actions of John Choon Yoo, simply 
cannot be permitted to stand unchallenged and unadjudicated forever.  As stated by 
United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, presiding over the first of the 
Nuremberg Tribunals: “The danger, so far as the moral judgment of the world is 
concerned, which will beset these trials is that they come to be regarded as merely 
political trials in which the victor wreaks vengeance upon the vanquished.”101 
As a nation of laws, and as the nation that claimed the moral authority to put 
on trial and punish Schlegelberger and the rest, the United States must not accept 
the disgrace that Justice Jackson rightly predicted would befall it should his 
warning to avoid double standards go unheeded.102 
                                                                                                     
lack of common sense, but also an ignorance of literature. Their surreal approach to the matter of the 
caterpillar clearly evokes a scene all too familiar to those who once feared that one day, this day would 
come.  As George Orwell presciently envisioned the scene, long ago:  
It was bigger than most of the cells he had been in.  He was strapped upright in a chair, 
so tightly that he could move nothing, not even his head.  A sort of pad gripped his head 
from behind, forcing him to look straight in front of him.  For a moment he was alone, 
then the door opened and O’Brien came in. “You asked me once”, said O’Brien, “what 
was in Room 101.  I told you that you knew the answer already.  Everyone knows it.  
The thing that is in Room 101 is the worst thing in the world.” The door opened again. 
A guard came in, carrying something made of wire, a box or basket of some kind. He 
set it down on the further table.  Winston could not see what the thing was.  “The worst 
thing in the world”, said O’Brien, “varies from individual to individual.  It may be 
burial alive, or death by fire, or by drowning, or by impalement, or fifty other deaths.  
There are cases where it is some quite trivial thing, not even fatal.”  He had moved a 
little to one side, so that Winston had a better view of the thing on the table.  It was an 
oblong wire cage .  Fixed to the front of it was something that looked like a fencing 
mask, with the concave side outwards.  Although it was three or four metres away from 
him, he could see that the cage was divided lengthways into two compartments, and that 
there was some kind of creature in each.  They were rats.  “In your case”, said O’Brien, 
“the worst thing in the world happens to be rats.”   
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 286 (1949). 
 101. Justice Robert H. Jackson, Statement on War Trials Agreement (Aug. 12, 1945), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_jack02.asp. 
 102. Any claim that the volume of injustice perpetrated against only a few detainees in America is 
not comparable to the Holocaust would be a particularly inappropriate argument. As the NMT stated 
with respect to a similar argument by Schlegelberger (who resigned from the Reich Ministry in protest 
long before the Nazi killing machine reached its full potential):  
The cruelties of the system which he had helped to develop were too much for him, but 
he resigned too late.  The damage was done.  If the judiciary could slay their thousands, 
why couldn’t the police slay their tens of thousands?  The consequences which 
Schlegelberger feared were realized.  The police . . . prevailed.  Schlegelberger had 
failed.  His hesitant injustices no longer satisfied the urgent demands of the hour.  
Altstoetter, supra note 86, at 1086-87.  
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V.  ADVOCACY OF THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE CONTINUES 
Although conclusions to be drawn from such comparisons are somewhat 
obvious, there is an understandable reluctance among scholars to label a colleague 
an adherent of National Socialism (i.e., a “Nazi”).  Any such reference is so 
overused an epithet that it has lost saliency as a tool to connote affinity with a well-
developed legal and political philosophy.  To be sure, the epithet is often 
misapplied, especially in the popular media. Study of such comparisons suffers as a 
result. 
No one could credibly claim that Professor Yoo is a Nazi.  He is not.  Nor can 
it be said that the Fuehrer principle belonged first or only to that odious regime.  In 
fact, it did not.  
What can be said, and what should be said is that the Fuehrer principle is a 
discernible theory of governance that inexorably bends toward atrocity.103  
Advocacy and adoption of the Fuehrer principle as a governing strategy in times of 
conflict, by whatever name and in whatever era, is wrong because it is 
fundamentally at odds with predictable justice.  The founders of the United States 
did not intend to create an office of the presidency with unchecked power to seize 
and torture persons in violation of the law. It is a perversion of history and 
American jurisprudence to contend otherwise.  When one person is given ultimate 
authority to do “whatever is necessary” under the guise of unlimited “war powers” 
the result has been and may be always the same.104  
To better understand to what ultimate end Professor Yoo’s theories of 
presidential war powers would lead, it is only necessary to examine to what end 
those theories have led.  Owing to a complete absence of accountability for what 
was done while he was with the OLC, Professor Yoo is able still to peddle a 
pernicious postulate of sovereign immunity in times of war, thanks in no small 
measure to the “academic freedom” afforded by the shelter of the academy.105  
Professor Yoo’s theories have evolved into a full-throated defense of extremism in 
the name of executive war power, even when that extremism results in horrifying 
                                                                                                     
 103. With apologies to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who said: “Let us realize the arc of the moral 
universe is long but it bends toward justice,” available at  http://www.indiana.edu/~ivieweb/ 
mlkwhere.html.  
 104. As John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, first Baron Acton (known simply as Lord Acton) 
stated, in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton in 1887: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely.”  LORD ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 335 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. 
1964). William Pitt, British Prime Minister from 1766 to 1778, similarly opined, in a speech to the 
House of Lords of the United Kingdom in 1770: “Unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those 
who possess it.”  William Pitt, Case of Wilkes Speech, Jan. 9, 1770.  
 105. Berkeley Law Dean Edley has asked whether holding Professor Yoo accountable for putatively 
criminal acts by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo, absent formal conviction, would chill 
academic freedom:  
Does what Professor Yoo wrote while not at the University somehow place him beyond 
the pale of academic freedom today? . . .  My sense is that the vast majority of legal 
academics with a view of the matter disagree with substantial portions of Professor 
Yoo’s analyses, including a great many of his colleagues at Berkeley.  If, however, this 
strong consensus were enough to fire or sanction someone, then academic freedom 
would be meaningless. 
Edley, supra note 29 (emphasis added).  
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acts. 
If there is any doubt that Professor Yoo is a staunch, if undeclared, advocate of 
the Fuehrer principle no matter what it may have wrought, his work since leaving 
the OLC dispels it.  Professor’s Yoo recent scholarship continues to demonstrate an 
unmistakable magnetism to National Socialist principles.  In a recent article about 
President Andrew Jackson, Professor Yoo endorses the most dangerous aspects of 
the Fuehrer principle, in prose nearly identical to the accolades that German legal 
scholars paid to it. 106  
Surely, Professor Yoo’s observation that “scholars continue to regard Jackson 
as one of the ten greatest presidents” is correct.107  However, Professor Yoo focuses 
not on those positive aspects of Jackson’s record that others might, but rather on 
certain aspects of Jackson’s terms in office that reflect brutal and blunt exercises of 
his executive power.  The best example of this is Professor Yoo’s analysis of 
Jackson on the “Indian question.”  
Andrew Jackson’s presidency is particularly associated, as Professor Yoo’s 
scholarship establishes, with “Indian removal”—an indelible stain on the fabric of 
the history of the United States. This program was rooted in racism and was 
essentially a policy of ethnic cleansing.  Professor Yoo describes it as a “pillar” of 
Jackson’s presidency.108  Although the infamous “Trail of Tears” “occurred after 
Jackson left office,” Professor Yoo forthrightly acknowledges that Jackson “surely 
bears great responsibility for the tragedy [because he] used the power of the 
Presidency to bring it about.”109 
According to Professor Yoo, Jackson’s racist policies produced Indian 
Removal “at a significant cost in lives.”110  That statement is truth enough.  After 
clinically describing the horror of those genocidal campaigns, however, Professor 
Yoo appears to be too ready to laud the putative benefits of Jackson’s racist 
policies.  
Professor Yoo is uninhibited in these claims.  He repeatedly justifies brutal 
ethnic cleansing by the ends it supposedly achieved.  He writes: 
In order to fulfill the promise of the West, settlers needed land. . . .  Federal policy 
recognized the Indian tribes were self-governing sovereigns, they should remain 
on their lands. . . . Jackson held a very different view.  He saw removal of the 
Indians as advancing America’s economic development and enhancing its strategic 
position in the Southwest.  Removing the Indians would open up fertile lands in 
the West to white settlement, and it would eliminate an anomaly from America’s 
sovereignty.111  
  He achieved what he had wanted—the removal of a perceived obstacle to the 
growth of the American republic.  Jackson opened up 100 million acres to white 
settlers in exchange for 30 million acres in Oklahoma and Kansas and seventy 
million dollars. . . . He . . . wanted to open the best farmland to white settlers and 
                                                                                                     
 106. John Yoo, Andrew Jackson and Presidential Power, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 521 (2008). 
 107. Id. at 574. 
 108. Id. at 531. 
 109. Id. at 536. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 531-32. 
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to impose state law so as to drive the Indians out.112 
  Despite . . . negative aspects to his time in office, scholars continue to regard 
Jackson as one of the ten greatest presidents.  His foreign policy expanded the 
frontiers of the nation and opened land to economic development. . . .  He could 
not have achieved [this] without a reinvigorated understanding of the 
constitutional powers of the [Presidency.]113 
Professor Yoo thus lists among President Jackson’s achievements the elimination 
of an “anomaly” from America’s sovereignty, the opening up of fertile lands for 
white settlers, and the supposedly consequent economic development that ethnic 
cleansing facilitated.  
Hitler described the reasons for and right to territorial expansion in nearly 
identical terms: 
[I]t is critical for a nation that its territory correspond to its population. . . . “The 
nation needs space.” . . . The question confronts us today as insistently as ever: No 
government, of whatever kind, can long escape dealing with it. . . . Increasing 
competition . . . naturally force[s] . . . states to use ever sharper weapons until one 
day the sharpest economic weapons will give way to the sharpness of the sword; 
that is, when a healthy nation faces the last either-or, and despite the greatest 
diligence cannot withstand the competition, it will reach for the sword because the 
question of life is always the problem about which life turns. It is a question of 
power. The first way to satisfy this need, the adjustment of territory to population, 
is the most natural, healthy and long-lasting. . . .The . . . foundation is power, 
always power. . . . We can see that today.114   
There is nothing new or novel about comparing the notion of the “manifest 
destiny” of the United States (a “policy” draped with racism) with the theory of 
lebensraum championed by the National Socialists in Germany.115 Yet, Professor 
                                                                                                     
 112. Yoo, supra note 106, at 536. 
 113. Id. at 574-75. 
 114. Adolf Hitler, Speech Delivered at the 1927 Nuremberg Rally, available at 
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/rpt27c.htm. 
 115. See, e.g., ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 403, 591 (John Chamberlain et al. eds., 1939).  See Eric 
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 689, 708 (2003) (arguing that the “policy of Lebensraum was premised on the claim that Germany 
was overcrowded and that the Germans, by virtue of the superiority of their race, had a right to the land 
owned by Slavs; the American policy of manifest destiny was based on the presumed superiority of 
American civilization”);  Lilian Friedberg, Dare to Compare: Americanizing the Holocaust, 24 AM. 
INDIAN Q. 353, 360-61 (2000) (comparing the U.S. government’s doctrine of Manifest Destiny with the 
German Lebensraumpolitik and arguing that the American genocide campaign against the Indians was a 
predecessor to the Nazi Holocaust, relying on, among other sources, DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN 
HOLOCAUST 153 (1992) (Hitler biographer John Toland recorded that the Führer was known to have 
“expressed admiration for the ‘efficiency’ of the American genocide campaign against the Indians, 
viewing it as a forerunner for his own plans and programs”);  A Conversation with R. David Edmunds 
(Anne and Chester Watson Chair in History in the University of Texas Dallas School of Arts and 
Humanities) Concerning Native American Displacement Amid U.S. Expansion (Apr. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.utdallas.edu/news/2009/06/25-002.php.  During the interview, Professor 
Edmunds noted:  
There is an interesting symbolic portrayal of Manifest Destiny that shows “Columbia,” 
the great American angel or woman, floating over the plains.  Ahead of her, in the West, 
is a great darkness populated by wild animals.  There are bears and wolves and Indian 
people, who are fleeing her light.  In her wake come farms, villages and homesteads and 
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Yoo seems to be unaware of this. He speaks of Jackson’s  policy of “Indian 
Removal” in terms of the greater good he finds it accomplished.  For Professor 
Yoo, the ends seem always to justify the means, and, this appears to be so, even if a 
vast group of human beings might have died in the process.  
The greater good, in Professor Yoo’s instantly recognizable view, is the 
establishment of the supreme authority of the executive. What is first and foremost 
in Professor Yoo’s scholarship is the Fuehrer principle. It appears that no matter 
what the wrong done, Professor Yoo returns to the putatively positive 
accomplishments that unchecked executive authority can achieve while waging 
“war”—foreign or domestic. Professor Yoo heaps praise on an ethnic cleanser 
because Jackson helped to lay the foundation for the Yoo vision of a dictatorial 
wartime Presidency.  
Making the comparison all the more precise, Professor Yoo even cites with 
approval the racist rationale for Jackson’s Indian Removal policy. Professor Yoo 
uncritically highlights Jackson’s patently racist and immoral excuse that ethnic 
cleansing worked for the “good” of the “Indians,” with no accompanying 
debunking of Jackson’s claim—a claim that speciously presupposed the futility of 
acting decently under the circumstances: 
Jackson . . . believed that whites and Indians could not live together and that the 
best solution was to keep the races apart. . . .  
  Jackson may have honestly believed that the lot of the Indians would be 
improved by distance from whites. His actions may have even prevented their 
wholesale destruction, which could have occurred had they attempted to remain in 
Georgia and other western states. . . .  [H]e believed himself to be protecting the 
Indians by keeping them apart from whites.116 
Compare Hitler’s rationale for ethnic cleansing: 
And thus it happens that for the first time it is now possible for men to use their 
God-given faculties of perception and insight in the understanding of those 
problems which are of more momentous importance for the preservation of human 
existence than all the victories that may be won on the battlefield or the successes 
that may be obtained through economic efforts. . . .  It is not for men to discuss the 
question of why Providence created different races, but rather to recognize the fact 
that it punishes those who disregard its work of creation. . . .  [T]his will not lead 
to an estrangement between the nations; but, on the contrary, it will bring about for 
the first time a real understanding of one another.117  
In the scholarly view of Professor Yoo, President Jackson (like Hitler) “honestly” 
observed that ethnic cleansing benefits the cleansed as much as the cleansers.  
Professor Yoo teaches us that a bigoted and fundamentally unnecessary genocide 
                                                                                                     
in the back are cities and railroads.  As the figure progresses across the land, the light of 
civilization dispels the darkness of ignorance and barbarity.  In this painting, Native 
American people are portrayed along with the animals and the darkness.  They have to 
be removed before Columbia can bring the prosperity promised to the United States.   
Id.  
 116. Yoo, supra note 106, at 532, 536. 
 117. Adolf Hitler, Speech on National Socialism and World Relations, delivered at the German 
Reichstag (Jan. 30, 1937), available at http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/hitler1.htm. 
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by forced expulsion legitimately could have been “honest believed” by Jackson to 
have been the alternative to simply exterminating or harassing into extinction the 
irrationally despised group in situ.118  
Aside from the supposed benefits of ethnic cleansing, Professor Yoo’s defense 
of Jackson’s policies stands on another independent ground. Professor Yoo’s 
admiration for the “good” accomplished by Jackson’s genocidal policies against the 
“Indians” also turns on the claim that “popular will” supported it.  Once again, 
Professor Yoo appears to accept, with implied approval, another of Jackson’s 
“honest” beliefs—that the racist underpinnings of his “Indian removal” policies 
were in keeping with a unitary “popular will.”  Professor Yoo writes that “[u]nder 
the standards of his time, Jackson’s views can be said to represent the views of the 
voting public.”119 
Are “the views” of that voting public something to be condemned?  To the 
contrary, according to Professor Yoo. In stark terms, Professor Yoo praises 
Jackson’s exercise of unilateral and anti-Constitutional executive authority, based 
on Jackson’s supposedly superior power to discern the putative “popular will”:120  
To Jackson, democracy meant that the will of the majority should prevail, 
regardless of existing governmental and social arrangements. . . . The Framers 
designed a government to check and balance majority rule with the Senate, the 
Electoral College, and an independent judiciary. Jackson followed a different 
star.121 
Professor Yoo conspicuously does not forthrightly and vigorously renounce that 
star as Caesar’s light. 
Undoubtedly, Professor Yoo would acknowledge that a majority of the 
German people also supported Hitler’s racist policies.  Be that as it may be, as 
recognized a Constitutional scholar as he cannot completely fail to understand that 
the Constitution of the United States is riddled with anti-democratic provisions—
and was designed precisely to avoid the tyranny of a real or imagined majority 
manifested in the racist policies of a rogue president.122  There is something 
                                                                                                     
 118. See, e.g., Edmunds, supra note 116.  Professor Edmunds explained the hypocritical nature of 
this particularly crass rationalization for Indian Removal:  
How do you rationalize the taking of land and the usurpation of property? The argument 
that was used was, “This had to be done to save these poor Indian people.  They don’t 
fit in the East, so we have to move them out beyond the frontier . . . .  This is the only 
possible way to save them.”  The hypocrisy of this is obvious because many of the 
people, though not all of them, who were removed were very sophisticated and 
relatively “civilized” people.  For example, the literacy rate of the Cherokee nation is 
higher than that of the white South up through the Civil War, yet the tribe was moved 
westward as an uncivilized people, so that their land could be open for American 
expansion.  
Id.  
 119. Yoo, supra note 106, at 536. 
 120. Despite praising Jackson as a supposed man of the people, Professor Yoo acknowledges that the 
revulsion arising out of Jackson’s dictatorial policies was so great that a new political party formed in 
the United States to oppose them. Professor Yoo writes: “He would also spark resistance so strong that it 
would coalesce into a new political party, the Whig party, devoted to opposing concentrated executive 
power.”  Id. at 526. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Justice Robert H. Jackson stated:  
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intellectually awry here.  
Professor Yoo’s tribute to the Fuehrer principle reaches its apogee in his 
analysis of the work of President Polk: 
Jackson’s restoration of the constitutional powers of the Presidency reached its 
apogee under his protégé, James K. Polk. . . .  Only by fully exercising the powers 
of the Presidency, as laid down by Andrew Jackson, could Polk’s determination to 
reach the Pacific have been realized. As Commander-in-Chief, Polk manipulated 
events to produce a war, maneuvered Congress into funding it, and held sole 
control over its goals and strategies. . . .  Polk “probably did as much as anyone to 
expand the powers of the Presidency—certainly at least as much as Jackson, who 
is more remembered for doing it.” . . .  Overcoming the errors of Madison’s ways, 
the vigor and energy of [Polk’s] leadership set the model for other Presidents in 
wartime. Polk’s success was inextricably intertwined with the Jacksonian 
understanding of a constitutionally energetic executive, and it worked to the 
nation’s incalculable benefit.123  
In this incredibly telling passage—the conclusion of his piece on Jackson—
Professor Yoo teaches that President Polk’s “manipulation of events” to form a 
pretext to “produce” war, and subsequent exercise of “sole control” over the goals 
and strategies of that war, are precedents of “incalculable benefit” to the 
governance of the United States.  This passage engages with approval not only the 
Fuehrer principle, but also the other primary basis for war crime charges against the 
former members of the Third Reich: aggressive war. 
To borrow a phrase: the glove fits. The Fuehrer principle has crept insidiously 
into American scholarship under the guise of advocacy of it by Professor Yoo (and 
some others), and, owing to his work at the OLC, has already undermined the 
governance of the United States.  The time for mere recognition that something 
went very wrong at the OLC during the Bush administration has passed; the time 
has come to permit Professor Yoo to test his theories about unaccountable 
presidential war powers in a court of law.124  
                                                                                                     
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.  One’s 
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and 
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on 
the outcome of no elections.  
W. Va. Bd. of Ed. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 123. Yoo, supra note 106, at 575, 583. 
 124. In an August 20, 2009, addendum to his original statement, Dean Edley plainly states:  
My belief then, and now, is that only in a court of law can we have definitive findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  We need both.  My friend Eric Holder, Attorney General 
of the United States, should either pursue the matter, or tell us that he believes there was 
no criminality.  We need to know what happened, and not just from journalists.  We 
need to know where the boundaries of lawful conduct are in combating national security 
threats.  We need to know when legal advice and advocacy become criminal.  
Christopher Edley, Jr., The Torture Memos, Professor Yoo, and Academic Freedom, BERKELEY L. 
NEWS ARCHIVE, Aug. 20, 2009, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/5961.htm.  Dean Edley has 
spoken rightly, and the Berkeley Law community now is better for it. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
At present, prosecution of former members of the Executive Branch is highly 
unlikely.  So too is any prosecution of Professor Yoo and his cohorts, despite a 
growing clamor to at least consider it in quarters where none was previously heard 
so clearly. As the Justice Department declines criminal prosecution of Yoo and 
Bybee, among others, it may yet suggest their disbarments—a futile gesture at this 
late date. 
Despite all of this, some action seems minimally necessary to determinately 
test those theories of governance, so prominently propounded by John Choon Yoo, 
that may threaten the rule of law in the United States.  
Sadly, in complete absence of any such action, a precedent will have been 
established for the future.  The absolution afforded by the OLC’s opinions may 
convince future attorneys that they too have the power to excuse almost any 
conduct by the executive ex ante.  And future presidents will be able to easily 
construct a wall of impenetrable and unaccountable power because of the current 
President’s decision to allow all done with the OLC’s imprimatur to be excused 
without trial. 
Professor Yoo succeeds, thusly.  Despite accomplishing what he set out to do, 
however, Professor Yoo will remain a man who must bear the burden of what he 
has done.  As stated by the Tribunal in pronouncing guilt on Defendant 
Schlegelberger: 
We are under no misapprehension. Schlegelberger is a tragic character. He loved 
the life of intellect, the work of the scholar. We believe that he loathed the evil that 
he did, but he sold that intellect and that scholarship . . . for a mess of political 
pottage and for the vain hope of personal security.125 
Professor Yoo and his colleagues at the OLC traded much of their considerable 
prestige for that same bowl of bitter political pottage.  While they might still recant 
their views about presidential authority, and as a result perhaps regain some of that 
prestige, they will stand unaccountable in the sense that accountability was 
envisioned by Justice Jackson—in another world, long ago. 
                                                                                                     
 125. Altstoetter, supra note 86, at 1087. 
